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Promises and Perils of New Global Governance:
A Case of the G20
Sungjoon Cho and Claire R. Kelly*

Abstract
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, a new global governance structure emerged.
During and subsequent to the crisis, the G20 emerged as a coordinating executive among
internationalgovernance institutions. It setpoliy agendas andprioriti.Zedinitiatives. Working
through the FinancialStability Board, the G20 coordinatedwith other governance institutions
and networks to set standards, monitor enforcement and compliance, and aid recovery. Its
partners included the International Monetary Fund, the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, the Organisationfor Economic Cooperation and Development, the World Trade
OrganiZation, the InternationalAssociation of Insurance Supervisors and the International
OrganiZation of Securities Commissions. Its authority cuts across regimes and creates
collaborative linkages between economic law and social issues such as food security and the
environment. Its leadership role, born out of exigeng, now continues to evolve aspartof the new
internationalorder of economic laws.
The G20's coordination of institutions and networks exemplies a new form of global
governance. Network coordination offers an opportunity to confront complex problems with a
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needed comprehensive approach. The institutions and networks engage in an ongoing dialectical
process thatpropels standardsetters toward convergence on a number offronts. The actors in
this process employ a vatiety of tools to forge consensus and the G20 leverages this consensuscreatingprocess to achieve its goals. Unpacking these tools can hep scholars tackle intricate
questions that arise from the G20's coordination role. In paricular,we focus on concerns
regardingthe effectiveness and legitimay of the G20's coordination of mulfiple networks and
institutions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
An unprecedented challenge calls for an unprecedented response. The
financial crisis in 2008, which precipitated the worst global recession since the
Great Depression in the 1930s, created an exigency that forced major global
economies to develop a new type of collective regulatory response, which was
largely unfathomable under traditional international cooperation mechanisms
such as diplomacy or treaty-making. The leaders of twenty major economiesthe G20 Leaders-promptly assumed the unprecedented role of an executive
coordinator over pre-existing transgovernmental regulatory networks (TRNs).'
In doing so, the G20 harnessed these sector-specific TRNs,2 comprised of
professional regulatory agencies from different economies, and set itself at the
helm as an executive coordinator. It promised the spontaneity and efficacy
necessary to respond to the financial crisis. This Article scrutinizes this
phenomenon of coordinated networks, which, until now, has been largely
unaddressed.
One of the greatest challenges globalization has brought to international
law is that it has irreversibly altered the traditional notions of time and space in
which scholars used to grapple with international law.' The end of the Cold War
and the spectacular advancement of technologies have molded a multi-faceted
phenomenon of globalization: integration, interdependence, spontaneity, and
synchrony. At an unprecedented pace, more goods, more services, more people,
and more money circulate all over the world.' Nevertheless, the global financial
crisis of 2008 has proven a sobering lesson that globalization remains a mixed

I

2

See, for example, Andrew F. Cooper, The G20 as an Improvised Crisis Committee and/or a Contested
'SteeringCommittee'for the World, 86 Intl Aff 741, 741-42, 746 (2010) (characterizing the G20 as a
"steering committee" or a "crisis committee" to deliver specific regulatory deliverables).
See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton 2004) (presenting one of the
most comprehensive narratives on nascent government networks and their norm-generating
effects). See also David Zaring, Rulemaking and Adjudication in International Law, 46 Colum J
Transnatl L 563, 576 (2008) (arguing that "networks are the rulemakers of international
administrative law").

3

See, for example, John Gerard Ruggie, Teritoriality and Bevond: Problematiging Modernity in
InternationalRelations, 47 Intl Org 139, 172 (1993) (observing the emergence of a "decentered yet
integrated space-of-flows, operating in real time, which exists alongside the spaces-of-places that
we call national economies").

4

Philip H. Gordon, Europe's Cautious GlobalZation, in Janet Laible and Henri J. Barkey, eds, European
Responses to Globalization: Resistance, Adaptation and Alternatives 1, 3 (Elsevier 2006) ('IC]learly the
degree, intensity, speed, volume, and geographic reach of economic globalization today far exceed
anything that has come before."); Dinah Shelton, Protecting Human Rights in a Globalied World, 25
BC Intl & Comp L Rev 273, 276 (2002) ("[1]nformation and communications technology has
emerged as a dominant force in the global system of production, while trade in goods, services,
and financial instruments are more prevalent than any time in history.").
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blessing. A globalized financial and trade system has forced national economies
to share not only prosperity but also risks. This dark side of globalization tends
to present daunting challenges to regulators-both domestic and international.s
First, the effects of domestic regulations may become limited as domestic
systems become highly sensitive to external forces. Second, as is seen in the
climate change debate, certain regulatory problems are inter-national per se.
Domestic regulatory efforts alone are insufficient to address such problems.
Third, international regulations, if any, may not come as quickly as the urgency
of the problems would demand.
At its inception and throughout the 2008 financial crisis, society saw
national governments struggle to muster up stimulus packages, fight off
protectionism, and save at-risk financial and corporate entities. Notably, society
also saw an international effort to facilitate these national efforts. The G20
Leaders initiated this international effort and managed to save twenty-one
million jobs in 2009 and 2010.' Ironically, however, the unprecedented success
of this global policy coordination led the public to perceive the G20 as a rather
superficial, that is to say, mainly "political" entity. In other words, the public
remains largely uninformed of the behind-the-scenes intensive regulatory
interactions among professional regulatory agencies at a micro-operationallevel.
The bottom line is that the G20 and the resources that it brought to bear on the
global economy did not spring out of nothing; they were, in fact, an outcome of
decades-long policy networks between and among like-minded government
officials communicating inside and outside of relevant international
organizations. Without the unique density and frequency of their interactions on
those critical issue areas (such as international finance and securities), the G20
could not have proved so successful: it would have probably been yet another
empty political initiative delivering no practical impacts. However, the G20's
coordination of these TRNs to confront the crisis clearly revealed a whole far
greater than the sum of its parts.
Admittedly, its success needs to be examined rigorously. Empirical
confirmations are still limited and any attempt to quantify these successes may
suffer from a selection bias. Nonetheless, the coordinated TRN phenomenon is
not a mere anecdote: it is a new trend that challenges our conventional
understanding of global governance. We must probe closely the new TRN
phenomenon, and in particular the coordination of networks, to verify whether

5

6

Slaughter characterizes the dilemma of needing more government yet fearing it as a "globalization
paradox." Slaughter, A New World Orderat 8 (cited in note 2).
Jonathan Lynn, G20 Saves 21 M jobs with Crisis Measures - UN (Reuters Apr 19, 2010), online at
4
(visited
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/0 /19/financial-jobs-idUSLDE63I24Q20100419
Oct 14, 2011).
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it brings truly beneficial changes and, if so, at what costs. And the mere fact that
a TRN successfully creates standards does not necessarily mean that it was as
successful as it could have been. Inherently, focusing on the standards that have
been developed will not address those instances where the TRN sought to, or
should have sought to, develop standards but failed.
In this regard, we propose to examine the work of the web of TRNs
involved in the G20's efforts to navigate through the financial crisis by
dissecting the G20's coordination through the use of regulatory blueprints or
frameworks, the means by which the TRNs arrive at decisions (dynamics), and
the decisions they reach (end products). Much has already been written about
TRNs,7 but one piece that has been missing is how the TRNs actually do their
work, in particular under a political coordinative mechanism, such as the G20.
Additionally, we identify a taxonomy of various moves (tools) made within
TRNs that we call the "intra-network dynamics." We make no judgment about
the value of any particular tool, although readers may quickly realize that some
tools are more palatable than others when one thinks about TRNs as a form of
global governance. While these social tools have already been extant in each
network, it was the rise of the G20 that awakened their genuine regulatory
potential in an unprecedented endeavor to deliver desperate regulatory effects to
avert the financial crisis.
We also consider the end products of these TRNs and identify their
characteristics as well as their utility. Again, we do not make any value judgment
about any particular end product. Instead, we hope that by revealing and
deconstructing the G20's coordination, the intra-network dynamics, and the end
products we can offer an analytical lens through which we better understand this
emerging paradigm of global governance. In our view, this lens will reveal
complex questions concerning efficacy and legitimacy.
The G20's executive coordination role represents a new paradigm of global
regulation, one that leverages the work of previously existing TRNs. Our thesis
on the G20 as a new paradigm of global governance unfolds in the following
sequence: Section II provides a working definition of a TRN. After providing an
intellectual pedigree and theoretical underpinnings behind the government
network theory, this Section highlights the TRN's various characteristics, such as
the expert, informal, and incremental nature of participants' dialogue and
eventual norm-generating operations. Section III offers a theory of network
coordination by explaining the use of frameworks or blueprints that take
advantage of preexisting network dynamics resulting in specific end products or
7

Pierre-Hugues Verdier, TransnationalRegulatory Networks and Their Limits, 34 Yale J Intl L 113, 114
(2009) ("In recent years, scholars of global governance have devoted substantial attention to the
promise and perils of ... regulatory networks (TRNs).").
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regulatory prototypes. Section IV applies the theoretical construction of
coordinated TRNs to the case of the G20. This case study describes both
empirical confirmations for and mismatches with the TRN model. Section V
evaluates the coordinated TRN model in accordance with two major criteria:
efficacy and legitimacy.
Finally, a caveat on this Article is in order. Due to its inevitable political
nature as a global executive coordinator, the G20 tends to draw various critiques
on its performance.' In particular, it has been faulted for being an "ineffective
talk shop."' Some question whether the G20 Leaders Summit will have any
influence once the crisis subsides.1 0 This criticism may be aggravated by
heightened expectations given the G20's initial successes." Yet our main focus
in this Article is the uncelebrated, workmanlike aspects of the G20 operation.
We aim to demonstrate, without any ideological bias, the G20's internal,
operational micro-dynamics, as well as certain conditions under which such
operations tend to work best.

8

See, for example, Peter Apps, Eurasia Chief Sees Leaderless "G-Zem" World (Reuters Jan 5, 2011),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/05/us-eurasia-interviewat
online
idUSTRE70422220110105 (visited Oct 14, 2011).

9

See Christopher Malcolm, And Then There Was One-An Overview of the Fifth Summit of the Americas,
16 L & Bus Rev Am 11, 16 (2010) ("There were still many others, however, that were skeptical
and had expected that it would be no more than a talk shop."); It Cuts Both Ways, Uncle Sam (Econ
Times Oct 20, 2010), online at http://aricles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2010-1019/news/27626561_1_global-imbalances-global-reserve-currency-numero-uno
(visited Oct 14,
2011) ("[T]he G20, a group that is mostly seen as a toothless body, a talk shop . . . .").

10

Colin I. Bradford and Wonhyuk Lim, Introduction: Toward the Consolidation of the G20: From Crisis
Committee to GlobalSteering Committee, in Coln I. Bradford and Wonhyuk Lim, eds, GlobalLeadership
in Transition:Making the G20 More Effective and Responsive 1, 1-2 (Brookings 2011) ("There is great
concern, expressed by II SaKong... the G20 may fade away as a significant forum for global
leadership as the global financial crisis subsides and the current focus on financial and macroeconomic issues increasingly shifts to technical matters unsuitable for discussion at the leadership
level.").

11

See, for example, Gabriele Steinhauser and Greg Keller, Fuzgy Compromise Threatens Relevance of G20 (AP Feb 17, 2011), online at http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=12942693
(visited Oct 14, 2011). High expectations on the role of the G20 seem to have formed already
among global trade investors. In the most recent incidence of global market volatility, investors
immediately turned to the G20 for a prompt collective response. See Se Young Lee, G20 Ministers
at
online
2011)
7,
Aug
J
St
(Wall
Call
Hold
(visited
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904140604576493472356478928.html
Oct 14, 2011); Isabel Versiani, G20 Depuies to Hold Crisis Call Saturday: Brazil (Reuters Aug 6,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/06/us-crisis-g20-callat
online
2011),
idUSTRE77522A20110806 (visited Oct 14, 2011).
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II. AN EMERGING GOVERNANCE MODEL:
TRANS-GOVERNMENTAL REGULATORY NETWORKS
The recent prominence of the G20 has demonstrated a new possibility in
tackling those challenges brought by globalization. TRNs offer a flexible and
pragmatic alternative to the treaty process. The TRN process is dialogical, normgenerating, and incremental.
TRNs represent a relatively recent, but increasingly prevalent, center of
international law-making. Traditionally international rules were negotiated and
concluded by a formal treaty-making process. However, barring some
exceptions, such as the EU, most international law-making now occurs in a
highly de-centralized structure, which militates against a domestic analogy. Even
with the existence of a well-operating international regulatory organization, such
as the World Trade Organization (WTO), any formal legislative outcome tends
to be limited, often minimal, for several reasons.12
First of all, a treaty-making process requires an enormous amount of
diplomatic and political effort in order to reach both consensus and compromise
among the parties concerned. Lobbies from interested and affected
constituencies are legion.13 Naturally, it is not only a painstaking but also a
treacherous process. Often, the process loses its initial passion or momentum as
it develops.14 Moreover, a treaty's legally "binding" nature tends to make

12

13

"4

See, for example, John H. Jackson, InternationalEconomic Law in Times ThatAre Interesting, 3 J Intl
Econ L 3, 8 (2000) (observing that "[tlreaties are often an awkward albeit necessary method of
designing institutions needed in today's interdependent world, but they do not solve many
problems"). Compare Charles Lipson, Why Are Some InternationalAgreements Informal?, 45 Intl Org
495, 537-38 (1991) (summarizing the benefits of informal agreements vis- -vis formal agreements
(treaties)).
See, for example, John H. Cushman, Jr, Intense Lobbing Against Global Warming Treaty (NY Times
Dec 7, 1997) online at http://www.nytimes.com/1997/12/07/us/intense-lobbying-againstglobal-warming-treaty.html?src=pm (visited Oct 14, 2011); Anup Shah, COP3-Koto Ptocol
at
Feb
15,
2002),
online
Conference
(Global
Issues
Climate
(visited Oct
http://www.globalissues.org/article/183/cop3-kyoto-protocol-climate-conference
14, 2011); Uiging the Oil and Auto Industries to Support the Kyoto Pmtocol (Greenpeace Apr 5, 2001),
online at http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/en/news-and-blogs/news/urging-the-oil-and-autoindust/ (visited Oct 14, 2011); Andrew C. Revkin, On Climate Issue, Industry Ignored Its Scientists, NY
Times Al (Apr 24, 2009).
See, for example, William J. Clinton, Excerptfrom Remarks by the President,March 25, 1998, in Philip
Auerswald, Christian Duttweiler, and John Garofano, eds, Clinton's Foreign Poliy: A Documentag
Record 218, 221 ("Internationally, as we meet here, talks are underway at the United Nations to
establish a permanent international criminal court. Rwanda and the difficulties we have had with
this special tribunal underscores the need for such a court. And the United States will work to see
that it is created."); American Non-Governmental Organization Coalition for the International
Criminal Court, Chronology of US Actions Related to the International Criminal Court (2011), online at
www.amicc.org/docs/US%20Chronology.pdf (visited Oct 14, 2011) ("The US votes against the
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negotiating parties reluctant to nail down any definite texts, because they want to
leave themselves enough flexibility for future contingencies." Likewise, treaties
are often accompanied by reservations, understandings, and declarations that
practically qualify their initial legal effects." Finally, just as a treaty-making
process is tortuous, so is its amending process.'" Therefore, a regulatory treaty,
once fixed, is hard to keep abreast of the subsequently changing regulatory
environment.
These shortcomings of treaties often lead to limited, or failed, international
cooperation. This cooperative failure in turn causes countries to adhere to their
own domestic regulations in a unilateral fashion. This regulatory failure is
especially problematic in the face of contemporary economic interdependence,
particularly in times of crisis. Global business betrays its frustration in the face of
this lack of regulatory coordination that is continuously fragmenting the global
marketplace against the wave of globalization." Diverging regulatory standards
in different states or regions tend to complicate, often prohibitively, optimal
global sourcing and the operation of global supply chains."
As a response to these challenges, new attempts have emerged to
overcome the problems of the conventional treaty-making process. Throughout
the world, regulators experiencing the same regulatory problems convene
frequently, meeting and talking with each other in order to enlighten and be
enlightened. They establish various kinds of relationships, from formal to
informal. Occasionally, international organizations like the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the WTO or the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) even provide like-minded regulators
with a number of forums in which to interact. Over time, relationships become
solidified and tend to evolve into systematized networks.20 These TRNs
adoption of the treaty out of concern that the ICC could accuse US nationals of crimes for
political reasons."); Henry T. King and Theodore C. Theofrastous, From Nuremberg to Rome: A Step
Backwardfor U.S. Foreign Poli, 31 Case W Res J Intl L 47, 50 (1999) ("[The US identified
ideological and political differences with the Statute.").
15

16

17

Sungjoon Cho, The WITO's Gemeinschaft, 56 Ala L Rev 483, 526 (2004). But see Oona A. Hathaway,
The Cost of Commitment, 55 Stan L Rev 1821, 1822-23 (2003) (explaining reasons why states may
wish to sign onto treaties).
See, for example, US Reservations, Declarations,and Understandingsto Human Rights Treaties (University
at
online
Library),
Rights
Human
Minnesota
of
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/usdocs/usres.htm (visited Oct 14,2011).

18

Anthony Arnull, Me and My Shadow: The Eumpean Court ofJustice and the Disintegration ofEuropean
Union Law, 31 Fordham Intl LJ 1174, 1187 (2008) (discussing the difficulty of amending treaties).
See Sungjoon Cho, Defragmenting World Trade, 27 Nw J Intl L & Bus 39, 67-68 (2006).

19

See, for example, Sungjoon Cho, Change DistortedRules, Nad L J 27 (May 7, 2007).

20

See notably Anne-Marie Slaughter, InternationalLaw in a World of Liberal States, 6 Eur J Intl L 503,
535 (1995); Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order,76 Foreign Aff 183, 184 (Sept-Oct

498

Vol 12 No. 2

Cho andKelly

Promises andPerils ofNew Global Governance

invariably produce certain regulatory norms.21 The recent experience of the G20
in response to a global financial crisis offers a propitious pathway toward such a
new paradigm of global lawmaking and global governance. 22

21

22

1997); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy through Government Networks, in Michael
Byers, ed, The Role of Law in InternationalPolitics: Essays in InternationalRelations and InternationalLaw
177, 178 (Oxford 2000).
Zaring, 46 Colum J Transnatl L at 576-79 (cited in note 2) (explaining some of the benefits to
international norm creation through networks).
In fact, the origin of TRNs dates back to the early seventies with the proliferation of UN agencies
such as the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). See generally UNICEF, About UNICEF, online
at http://www.unicef.org/uwwide/ (visited Oct 14, 2011); UNESCO, About Us, online at
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/unesco/about-us/ (visited Oct 14, 2011). See also Sungjoon
Cho, Rethinking APEC: A New Experiment for a Post-Modern InstitutionalArrangement, in Mitsuo
Matsushita and Dukgeun Ahn, eds, WlTO and East Asia: New Perspectives 381, 401 (Cameron May
2004) ("These professional agencies flourished under the auspices of the UN as many
government officials or agencies convened, exchanged views and undertook joint actions in their
sector-specific fora."). In this context, it can be said that few purely "domestic" issues remain in
an era of globalization and interdependence. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), Globalisation: What Challenges and Opportunitiesfor Governments? *4 (1996),
at
online
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=OCDE/GD(96)64&
docLanguage=En (visited Oct 14, 2011). Likewise, in the US, non-foreign affairs agencies, such as
the Department of Justice and the Department of Treasury, accounted for a dramatic increase
(from 1,578 to 2,265: 44 percent) in the levels of US direct hires overseas over the decade from
1984 to 1994, which mainly reflected the increasing "globalization" of US national policy. US
Government Accountability Office, Overseas Presence: Staffing at US Dplomatic Posts, Report to the
Chairman, Legislation and National Security Subcommittee, Committee on Government
Operations, House of Representatives, GAO/NSIAD-95-50FS 18-21 (Dec 1994). Keohane and
Nye depicted this phenomenon as "societal interdependence" which engenders "policy
interdependence." Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Transgovernmental Relations and
InternationalOrganiZations, 27 World Pol 39, 61 (1974). In the same vein, Hopkins also observed
that "increased interdependence" elicited many important questions, for example: "[H]ow should
the world's food, energy and natural resources be shared among the world's peoples?" Raymond
F. Hopkins, Global Management Networks: The Internationalizationof Domestic Bureaucracies,30 Intl Soc
Sci J 31, 31 (1978). Future international transactions including imports and exports would be
hampered by potential regulatory gaps between domestic and international arenas. As a
prescription for "global market failure," Professor Jackson has emphasized the necessity of
"human institutions" that help markets to function successfully. Jackson, 3 J Intl Econ L at 4-5
(cited in note 12). TRNs, discussed in this paper, can be said to fall within the rubric of such
human institutions at large. In addition, technological innovation such as the Internet has since
contributed significantly to the ability to respond to the various transgovernmental regulatory
needs brought about by globalization. Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation:
TransgovernmentalNetworks and the Future of InternationalLaw, 43 Va J Intl L 1, 12 (2002) (observing
that "the rise of... the Internet has progressively made long-distance communication, and thus
networks, far easier. . . "). See also discussion in note 3. Endogenously, government officials have
become more professional and expert in the face of the aforementioned complicated and turbulent
regulatory challenges. See also, for example, Jane Perlez, As Diplomay Loses Luster, Stars Flee State
Dept., NY Times A10 (Sep 5, 2000) (quoting Mark L. von Hagen, Director of the Harriman
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TRNs
are
First,
key
characteristics.
several
TRNs
have
"transgovernmental," rather than "international."2 Existing national agencies are
trans-linked to each other. They do not assume an international space of their
own. 24 As trans-national,TRNs mainly consist of players from the public sector,
that is, of the working-level government officials. For example, the main
banking network, the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (BCBS) is
comprised of the central bank governors from twenty-seven countries.2 5
Although Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) may play an important
role in the operation of TRNs, they are not the primary actors.26

23

24
25

26

Institute at Columbia University, stating that "smart graduates who want to join government are
heading for the Departments of the Treasury or Commerce").
See Keohane and Nye, 27 World Pol at 41 (cited in note 22). They limited the term
"transnational" to nongovernmental actors, and the term "transgovernmental" to define sub-units
of governments on those occasions when they act relatively autonomously from high politics.
Cho, RethinkingAPEC at 402 (cited in note 22).
Bank for International Settlements (BIS), About the Basel Committee, online at
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/about.htm (visited Oct 14, 2011).
In some cases, a (private) transnational network plays a cooperative and complementary, but
sometimes competitive, role vis-a-vis a (public) government network. For instance, a private
network under the aegis of the International Federation of Stock Exchanges (FIBV)-a trade
organization for regulated securities and derivative markets world-wide-is regarded as a
counterpart to a public network under the auspice of the International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO), which represents the world's governmental agencies involved with the
supervision of financial markets. The FIBV name has changed to the World Federation of
Exchanges (WFE). WFE, About WFE, online at http://www.world-exchanges.org/about-wfe
(visited Oct 14, 2011). See also WFE, Our Mission, online at http://www.worldexchanges.org/about-wfe/our-mission (visited Oct 14, 2011); IOSCO, IOSCO Historical
Background, online at http://www.iosco.org/about/index.cfm?section=background (visited Oct
18, 2011). One of its basic roles is "to act as the central reference point for the industry by
offering members guidance in the process of international harmonization of business practices,"
which is quite complementary to the IOSCO's regulatory role considering that it is composed of
"regulates." See WFE, What We Do, online at http://www.world-exchanges.org/about-wfe/whatwe-do (visited Oct 18, 2011). However, some of the FIBV's (WFE's) goals-for example, "to
maintain a platform for securities markets professionals to discuss issues of common interest"may overlap with those of the IOSCO, in which sense the relationship between these two
networks can be depicted as "competitive." See id. Meanwhile, it is worth highlighting that the
two networks interact (network) with each other, for instance, by participating in the other's

meetings. WFE, WFE Becomes Affiliate Member of IOSCO, online at http://www.world(visited Oct 18, 2011).
exchanges.org/news-views/news/wfe-becomes-affiliate-member-iosco
Another example of such interaction between a transnational (private) network and a
transgovernmental (public) regulatory network can be found in the relationship between the
International Finance and Commodities Institute (IFCI), the BIS, and the IOSCO. The IFCI, a
non-profit organization nesting a network among the world's major derivatives exchanges and
financial firms, web-posts a quarterly updated library of approximately one hundred official
documents contributed by major international regulatory organizations such as the BIS and the
at
online
of
Public
Documents,
IOSCO
Library
See
IOSCO,
IOSCO.
http://www.iosco.org/library/index.cfmbwhereami=pubdocs (visited Oct 18, 2011). Despite
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Second, a TRN is "regulatory" in nature, which means it deals with
particular regulatory issues or problems.27 Thus, TRNs differ from "transjudicial networks," which involve judges from different jurisdictions exchanging
views." For example, the major insurance network, the International
Association of Insurance Supervisors (AIS), sets standards meant to guide
national insurance regulators in their regulation of insurers.29
Third, a TRN is a "network." Although the network concept can cover a
range of gatherings, its most important feature is that it represents not an entity
but a process.30 The process allows a TRN to be positioned in a symbiotic
relationship with conventional international organizations. In other words,
networking as a process can take place in an international organization qua
entity. The process capitalizes on a "common 'belief or 'faith' . . . to better
regulatory outcomes" among networkers." This common belief tends to
originate from common knowledge and experience shared by participants of the
network, in other words, professional working-level government officials.32

27

these rich interactions between transnational (private) networks and transgovernmental (public)
regulatory networks, such transnational (private) networks should be understood as
complementary to the transgovernmental (public) network in terms of regulatory function.
Although the "new medievalists" proclaim the end of the nation-state thanks to the "information
technology revolution," "private power is still no substitute for state power," and "[a] gain in
power by nonstate actors does not necessarily translate into a loss of power for the state."
Slaughter, 76 Foreign Aff at 183-84 (cited in note 20). Likewise, Sol Picciotto also acknowledges
the validity of states themselves, though he observes a new trend of disintegration within them.
Sol Picciotto, Networks in InternationalEconomic Integration: FragmentedStates and the Dilemmas of NeoLiberafism, 17 Nw J Ind L & Bus 1014, 1015-22 (1996-97). Professor Freeman conceptualizes
"public governance" in a novel way as a "set of negotiated relationships between the public and
the private." Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 NYU L Rev 543, 548 (2000).
According to this view, the regulatory decision-making process tends to be decentralized, since
"public and private actors negotiate over policy making, implementation, and enforcement." Id.
As a result, a more cooperative or "aggregate" notion of accountability is offered as an alternative
to "formal and hierarchical" accountability that dominates conventional administrative law. Id at
549.
Cho, Rethinking APECat 402 (cited in note 22).

28

See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U Richmond L
Rev 99 (1994) (exploring the commonalities among, and consequences of, several instances of
trans judicial communication); Cho, Rethinking APEC at 402 (cited in note 22).

29

IAIS,

30

Cho, Rethinking APEC at 402 (cited in note 22).

31

Id.
In the context of Western social and philosophical traditions, one may attribute a theoretical root
of this TRN to the notion of "social epistemes," connoting both the German tradition of viewing
society as "comprising webs of meaning and signification" and the French tradition of exploring
"mentalitis collectives." Ruggie, 47 Ind Org at 157 (cited in note 3).

32

Insurance Core Princales, Standards, Guidance and Assessment (2011) online at
http://www.iaisweb.org/_temp/InsuranceCore_PrinciplesStandardsGuidance-and Asse
ssmentMethodologyOctober 2011 .pdf (visited Nov 21, 2011).
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International organizations often provide government networkers with physical
forums while some TRNs may even mirror the operational format of
international organizations.33 Therefore, any physical body or even a more fluid
relationship may fall under this category once it meets certain requirements
characterizing it as a network.34 For example, the banking network, which
includes the BCBS, can operate within the IMF.
Already in the early seventies, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye observed
this phenomenon among like-minded government officials and labeled it
"transgovernmental coalition building."35 They highlighted a "sense of
collegiality" developed and reinforced by their membership in a common
profession, which may be analogous to the "epistemic community," as Peter
Haas famously dubbed it." Likewise, Eugene A. Ludwig, then US Comptroller
of the Currency, submitted in 1996 that "I am convinced that all regulators
today share a common concern that spans geographical boundaries and
transcends cultural barriers. All of us speak the shared language of safety and
soundness."3 Naturally, it is this shared professional or expert culture that tends
to secure a high level of compliance with what a TRN produces as a normative
output.38 Perhaps this fidelity to network-generated norms can be said to result
from a bureaucratic habit or bureaucratic culture that is analogous to the "law
habit."

33

34
3s
36

37

38

39

See Raustiala, 43 Va J Intl L at 6, 87-88 (cited in note 22) (identifying a "synergistic" relationship
between treaties and networks due to the former's political and institutional contributions to the
latter).
Cho, Rethinking APEC at 402 (cited in note 22).
Keohane and Nye, 27 World Pol at 44 (cited in note 22).
Id at 45; Peter M. Haas, Introduction:Epistemic Communities and InternationalPody Coordinaion,46 Intl
Org 1, 2 (1992).
John E. Shockey, Bank Regulatoy Examination and Enforcement after Barings and Daiwa, in Financial
Sen'ices Litigadon, 935 Corp L & Practice Course Handbook 681, 708 (Practicing Law Institute
1996).
Here, the meaning of compliance is mostly limited to a soft dimension in the absence of any
technically binding force. If the concept of compliance involves a hard (political) dimension, such
as national legislation, as it often does in public international law, it invites a whole range of
different issues, such as the depth of compliance and the measurement.
David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Tihght Existence of InternadonalFinancial
Regulatory OrganiZtions,33 Tex Intl J 281, 303 n 189 (1998); R.R. Baxter, InternationalLawin 'Her
Infinite Variegy," 29 Intl & Comp L Q 549, 556 (1980). In building up such common belief and
faith, another psychological element, namely "trust," serves as an important catalyst. See Scott H.
Jacobs, Why Governments Must Work Together, 186 OECD Observer 13, 14-15 (Feb-Mar 1994).
Therefore, government officials may have to invest more time in communicating better among
each other as well as familiarizing themselves with one another's administrative style for the sake
of successful networking. Id. See also Les Metcalfe, The Weakest Links: Building Organisational
Networksfor Multi-Level Regulation, in Regulatoy Co-Operationfor an Interdependent World 49, 57 (OECD
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TRNs involve an ongoing dialogue, although the forums for that dialogue
may change.4 0 Early in the seventies, Keohane and Nye, in their pioneering
work, developed a notion of "complex interdependence," an ideal type of
international relations that correlated with reluctance to resort to the use of force
among a group of states with "multiple channels of contact connect[ing]
societies." 4 1 A subset of their notion of complex interdependence is the
phenomenon of "transgovernmental communication," the existence of
"informal ties between government elites," and direct meetings and
communications between bureaucrats from different countries, which coexist
with formal foreign office arrangements.42 Raymond Hopkins also highlights this
dialogical process in developing working relationships through "[t]elephone
calls, correspondence, regular meetings and . .. pre-meeting agenda sessions."4
TRNs work incrementally though day-to-day interactions. These quotidian
interactions are un-dramatic, if not mundane, but they can have an enormous
effect on the eventual shape of regulation." For example, a joint report by the
BCBS and the Technical Committee of the International Organization of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO), which was issued to the public in September
1998, was a revised version of an earlier, similar report jointly published in May
1995 by the same TRNs to assess the derivatives activities of banks and
securities firms. 45 This revision represents ongoing and cumulative efforts by the
BCBS and IOSCO with a view to keeping pace with an ever-changing regulatory
environment in this area, namely, "financial innovation and progress in risk
management field for trading and derivatives activities, in particular with regard
to market risk."46 It reflects earlier work of the two TRNs, including the 1994
Joint Release of Guidelines for improving risk management of derivatives activities
1994) (arguing that the establishment of "trust and confidence" among the organizations
participating in a regulatory system has an important bearing on the reliability of an interorganizational network). But see Jeffery Atik, Science and InternationalRegulatory Convergence, 17 Nw J
Intl L & Bus 736, 758 (1996-97) (questioning the possibility of expert consensus by arguing that
"scientific consensus is geographically distributed and flows from centers of influence").
4
41

42

Cho, Rethinking APEC at 403 (cited in note 22).
Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence 24-25 (Little, Brown 1977);
Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence Revisited, 41 Intl Org 725,
731 (1987). See also Slaughter, 6 EurJ Intl L at 512-13 (cited in note 20).
Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence at 25-26 (cited in note 41); Slaughter, 6 Eur J Intl L at
513 (cited in note 20).

43

Hopkins, 30 Intl Soc Sci J at 36 (cited in note 22).

44

Cho, Rethinking APEC at 403 (cited in note 22).

45

Basel Comm on Banking Supervision and the Technical Comm of the IOSCO, Frameworkfor
Supervisory Information about Derivaives and TradingActivities, Joint Report *i (Sept 1998), online at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs39.pdf (visited Oct 15 2011).

46

Id.
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and subsequent risk management guidance as well as the 1995 Joint
Recommendationsfor EnhancingPublic Disclosure.47
Thus, we see the products of TRNs undergo evolution. This evolutionary
nature ensures streamlined and updated regulatory guidelines so that policy
measures reflect the ever-changing regulatory environment. The Asian Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum provides another apt example. APEC
houses a variety of TRNs. It works through everyday communications among
sector-specific actors (government officials and businessmen). Various kinds of
Working Groups produce concrete action plans or programs in those functional
areas, such as energy, telecommunication, or transportation.4 8 The APEC Food
System (AFS) illustrates an evolution of a regulatory prototype. In 1999 the
APEC leaders adopted the AFS upon the recommendation by the APEC
Business Advisory Council in order to "efficiently link together food production,
food processing and consumption to meet the food needs of our people as an
essential part of achieving sustainable growth, equitable development and
stability in the APEC region." 4 9 The AFS generated many recommendations
concerning "efficiency in agricultural production, supply and trade, including the
importance of technology, adding value to agricultural production and
improving infrastructure."' 0 The Agricultural Technical Cooperation Working
Group (ATCWG) is a key implementer of these AFS recommendations. These
recommendations took a more concrete and targeted form (regulatory
prototype) when APEC Senior Officials, under the auspices of the
AFS/ATCWG network, launched the "APEC Food Security Work Plan," in
response to the surge in regional food prices in 2008."
Therefore, a myriad of regulatory dialogues among working-level officials,
not ministers and politicians, within TRNs tend to generate varying types of
normative references with different titles, such as framework, recommendation,
and work plan, which we collectively define as "regulatory prototypes." 52
Although they largely remain "soft"-technically non-binding-unlike hard law
47
48

Id.

Cho, Rethinking APEC at 410, 416 (cited in note 22). See also Martin Rudner, Institutional

Approaches to Regional Trade and Cooperationin the Asia PacificArea, 4 Transnatl L & Contemp Probs
159, 173-75 (1994) ("Consequently, unlike other formal international organizations, APEC
retains a strong potential that regulatory challenges are duly 'managed,' rather than 'solved."').

50

APEC, APEC Food System, online at http://www.apec.org/Groups/Other-Groups/APEC-FoodSystem.aspx (visited Oct 15, 2011).
APEC,
2006 APEC Food System
Report to the Ministers *2,
online
at
http://www.apec.org/Groups/OtherGroups/-/media/Files/Groups/AFS/06_csom_005_AFS.ashx (visited Oct 15, 2011).

5

APEC, APEC Food System (cited in note 49).

52

Cho, Rethinking APEC at 403 (cited in note 22).
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(treaty), they can still play an important role in shaping and coordinating
professional (regulatory) behaviors of networkers.
In conclusion, TRNs have been around for some time. They have arisen in
part in response to the weaknesses in the treaty system with regard to tackling
the pressing needs of globalization. They are also the function of professional
expert communities that share understandings and a desire to find solutions to
common problems. The means by which they find these solutions involves a
process. This process may or may not be situated within a number of
institutional forums. The power of these networks results from the intranetwork dynamics they foster and the end products that they develop.
III. A THEORY OF NETWORK COORDINATION:
PRE-EXISTING NETWORKS, REGULATORY PRODUCTS, AND
OPERATIVE FRAMEWORKS
States can address complex problems through coordination of TRNs. By
constructing frameworks (or blueprints) that chart goals for various TRNs,
states can tackle complex systemic regulatory challenges. These frameworks
instruct TRNs to work towards specific goals. TRNs are well-suited for the tasks
assigned to them because of pre-existing relationships and network dynamics of
the network participants. These dynamics allow TRNs to develop specific end
products called "regulatory prototypes" that can be absorbed into domestic
structures through a variety of strategies to fulfill the goals of the blueprint or
framework. This coordination of TRNs can lead to complex regulatory
responses to global problems that are well-suited for adoption at the national
level. We probe examples of this phenomenon in Section IV. We discuss
whether these responses are desirable from a legitimacy and efficacy standpoint
in Section V.
A. Theory of TRN Coordination
organizing
coordination involves governmental coalitions
TRN
multifaceted responses to global regulatory challenges by leveraging the work of
pre-existing networks to develop specific regulatory products meant to be
nationalized. Government groupings (such as the G7, G8, or G20) have
coordinated responses to political challenges or crises.53 Using action plans,
called frameworks or blueprints, these groupings can instruct multiple actors,

53

Robert P. Delonis, Note, InternationalFinancialStandards and Codes: Mandatory Regulation without
Representation, 36 NYU

J Intl

L & Pol 563, 586-91 (2004). See generally Mario Giovanoli, The

Reform of InternationalFinancialArchitectureafterthe Global Crisis, 42 NYU
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and in particular TRNs, to take action simultaneously and in pursuit of a
common objective.
To tackle cross-border, cross-sector problems, states sometimes develop
frameworks or blueprints, which embody basic agendas or action plans, rather
than specific standards. A coordinating coalition builds these agendas and tasks
various actors with the production of more specific regulatory prototypes. These
plans form in part out of a common understanding of the problem and the need
for a coordinated response. International regulators, and even leaders, share a
belief in the necessity of these plans; they understand and agree that some
regulations require not only cross-border coordination but cross-network
coordination.
Frameworks emerged long before the 2008 crisis. 5 4 For example, in 1999
the G20 Finance Ministers created the Joint Forum, a blueprint for collaboration
amongst the BCBS, IOSCO and the IAIS. The Joint Forum is characterized by
technical efforts from each of the parent organizations, and its blueprint requires
that it focus on particular subjects of interest to each of the parent entities,
including risk assessment, capital adequacy, and the regulation of financial
conglomerates." In short, the blueprint for the Joint Forum recognized the need
for a cross-sector approach to regulating financial conglomerates. The blueprint
involves all three entities in an action plan that focuses primarily on two lines of
inquiry (capital risk and conglomerate supervision)."
Frameworks are generally unambiguous since they set out specific tasks for
corresponding networks. Nonetheless, they lack the level of technical precision
required in the case of "regulatory prototypes."" While these blueprints assign
each particular network a specific task, they may still be silent regarding exactly
how such tasks will be operationalized. Initially, though, the blueprint sets a plan

5

As seen in the G7 or G8 experiences, major economies had tried to coordinate their financial and
macroeconomic policies in the past. See, for example, John Kirton and Antara Haldar, G7/8
online
at
2003),
(Toronto
Mandates,
1975-2003
Remit
Summit
http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/evaluations/factsheet/factsheet remits.html (visited Oct 15, 2011)
(listing mandates including: "At our next Summit, we will review progress on the implementation
of the G8 Africa Action Plan on the basis of a final report from our Personal Representatives for
Africa"; "Our goal for the next Summit is to develop an international financing plan for
plutonium management and disposition based on a detailed project plan, and a multilateral
framework to co-ordinate this co-operation"; "We are determined to speed up the
implementation of our national plans called for under the Rio Climate Treaty and we will each
report what we have achieved at next year's Summit").

55

See BIS, Mandate of the Joint Forum, online at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/jfmandate.htm (visited Oct
15, 2011).

56

Id.

57

See notes 68-89 and accompanying text.
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at the network-coordination level. Thus, it is the first step in a multi-layered
process of cross-networking.
Since a framework or blueprint denotes a long-term plan, its actualization
necessarily involves several incremental steps on different levels, such as
working-level officials, deputy ministers, ministers, and leaders of the various
TRNs. Notably, these several incremental processes may proceed simultaneously
through rounds of dialogue and communication among the network actors. It is
in this sense that a blueprint plants seeds for subsequent networking and
consequent regulatory prototype-building.
The individual TRNs gain strength and legitimacy from being part of the
overall plan in the same way that the overall plan legitimizes itself through the
use of the pre-existing networks. By infusing a large dose of political capital in
largely uncoordinated pre-existing sector-specific government TRNs, states
legitimize these networks while at the same time leveraging their capital and
legitimacy. TRNs' capital results from their prior workings and in particular
results from complex intra-network dynamics.
B. Intra-Network Dynamism
TRN coordination takes advantage of the pre-existing intra-network
dynamics that exist among networkers. These varying internal social dynamics
represent different operationalizing forces in each network. They are the main
engines of networks that the executive coordinator maneuvers. While these
dynamics were already present in each network, it was the advent of the G20
that awakened their genuine regulatory potential in an unprecedented endeavor
to deliver regulations desperately needed to avert the financial crisis.
While TRN participants share mutual trust distilled from similar expertise,
their knowledge-base or experiences may vary. Several dynamics are at play as
they work through these differences; we label them: (1) persuasion, (2)
negotiation, (3) strategic co-optation, (4) willing marginalization, (5) responsive
engagement and (6) expert sympathization." These features fall neatly into a
constructivist toolbox. Constructivist scholars have long posited that institutions
shape the preferences of participants. 9 By identifying the dynamics, tools,
58

Regarding an earlier attempt to identify similar patterns of intra-network dynamics (interactions)
according to the density of communication, see Sungjoon Cho, GATT Non-Violation Issues in the
IVTO Framework:Are They the Achilles' Heel of the WTO Dispute Settlement Process?,39 Harv Intl L J
311, 346 n 188 (1998).

s9

See John Gerard Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Uilitarianism and the Social
Constructiist Challenge, 52 Intl Org 855, 856, 870 (1998); Alexander Wendt, Collective Identity
Formation and the InternationalState, 88 Am Pol Sci Rev 384, 385-87 (1994); Claire R. Kelly, The
Value Vacuum: Sef-Enforcing Regimes and the Dilution of the Normative Feedback Loop, 22 Mich J Intl L
673, 678 (2001).
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dialogues, and discourses that network players use to influence each other we
hope to reveal how preferences may change-or appear to change. Coordinated
TRNs take advantage of these dynamics to pursue specific regulatory end
products that are part of a planned coordinated response to a global problem.
Unpacking the dynamics at work is important for the later task of assessing the
efficacy and legitimacy of the ultimate response.
1. Persuasion.
Participants in TRNs may simply influence ("persuade") each other to
change each other's regulatory behavior. Suppose that A is a specific regulatory
agency of Country X, and B is a corresponding agency in Country Y. By
providing various incentives, such as better regulatory information or more
highly developed technology, A can persuade B to adjust the latter's original
policy stance. This type of interaction often leads to a diffusive and osmotic
mode of regulatory change, rather than a commandeering mode.60 Here, for
example, it is entirely conceivable that a developed-country member may
provide certain technical assistance or advice to a developing-country member in
order to reinforce the former's persuasive power. In this way, a network model
can explain more subtle dynamics than mere legislation in regulatory agencies'
behavioral change.6 ' To capture fully the intra-network dynamics behind this
regulatory persuasion, one needs to recall one of the defining characteristics of a
TRN discussed above, that is, a social bond among sector-specific government
agencies or officials (networkers). This endogenous nature of social interaction
among networkers enables us to account for the "normative self-understanding
of the ends held by the social groups in question" in our theory.6' This is why
constructivism may provide a richer account than conventional international
relations theories, such as realism, of the "sticky"'6 bond among social actors
(here, networkers).6 4
Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks present perhaps the strongest version of
persuasion. Adopting a sociological concept of "acculturation," they raise the
possibility of social actors' assimilation of the "beliefs and behavioral patterns of
60
61
62
63
64

Raustiala, 43 Va J Intl L at 51 (cited in note 22).
Id at 54 (observing that networks "touch on issues such as the structure of enforcement and the
training of personnel").
Ruggie, 52 Intl Org at 860 (cited in note 59). See generally Max Weber, The Methodologe of the Social
Sciences (Free 1949) (Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch, eds and trans).
See Harold Hongju Koh, Wy Do Nations Obey InternadonalLaw?, 106 Yale LJ 2599,2602-03,2655
(1997).
This normative intersubjectivity generates "critical self-reflection," which "gives us perspective on
our social environment and helps us to overcome any false sense of determinism." Alexander
Wendt, Social Theog ofInternaionalPoiics375 (Cambridge 1999).
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the surrounding culture."6 Interestingly, this acculturation results more from a
structural cognitive pressure to assimilate within the group than from the
"merits" of a particular model. 6 Under this circumstance, however, networking
is prone to two types of criticism. First, any behavioral change in this situation
might be ostensible conformity, rather than a genuine modification of an earlier
position. Second, less politically powerful members of the group might be
pressured into accepting certain regulatory models prescribed by powerful
members without due consideration of the actual merits of such models."
2. Negotiation.
Second, in some cases, A and B can negotiate over certain issues of mutual
interest and produce a settlement on the basis of reciprocity. This may occur in a
"Record of Understanding" or a "Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)."
While this mode of interaction inevitably involves some type of bargain, it
should not necessarily be equated with a political, strategic give-and-take process
that is often seen in the conventional international treaty negotiation.
Importantly, an intra-network negotiation need not be zero-sum. It involves the
participants' of the TRN continuously adjusting their different interpretations
and eventually expanding their shared ground. In this regard, an intra-network
negotiation may be understood as a "cross-persuasion": one party's persuasion is
contingent on that of the other party. The dynamic outcome of such negotiation
as a cross-persuasion is likely to be positive-sum, which is capable of generating
regulatory convergence. For example, the US might accept the EU's position in
favor of stricter credit rating agency (CRA) regulation in exchange for the latter's
adoption of a variant of the former's Volcker rule.
3. Strategic co-optation.
Third, a strategic co-optation may transpire among network participants.
"Strategic co-optation," as described by Philip Selznick, is the "process of
absorbing new elements into the leadership of the policy-determining structure

65

Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: SodakZation and InternationalHuman Rights
Law, 54 Duke L J 621, 626 (2004).

66

Id at 643.

67

Id.

68

See Section IV.B.

69

We owe Pierre-Hugues Verdier for this point. The Volcker rule, named after former Federal
Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, "prohibits any bank or bank affiliate from engaging in
proprietary trading or investing in or sponsoring a hedge fund or private equity fund, subject to
certain exceptions." Charles K. Whitehead, Regulaingfor the Next Financial Crisis, 37 Cornell L F
20, 23 (2011).
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of an organization to avert threats to its stability or existence." 70 For example,
one network actor might invite another to serve as a "policy advisor" for a
regulatory project, perhaps because the first networker lacks the necessary
capacity to act alone.7 ' This self-invoking nature distinguishes co-optation from
other modes of intra-network dynamics, such as persuasion or negotiation, in
which case the pressure for regulatory behavioral change comes from outside.
4. Willing marginalization.
Fourth, network members may engage in "willing marginalization." Willing
marginalization happens when network members agree to participate knowing
that they will have limited influence. Members may be motivated by the hope
that even a reserved mode of participation now will lead to greater future
participation. Thus, suppose that network member A supports position X,
which is generally disfavored by network member B. Suppose further that B has
very little influence. Here, B might still welcome an invitation by A to
collaborate. A may be engaging in a persuasion leading to the willing
marginalization of B. Lastly, network members may face the real possibility that
their choice is simply to remain in the network, with limited influence, or to be
out of the network. Being in the network may be the better alternative not only
because they may hope for greater influence in the future but because
membership may signal acceptance or other important values to other
constituencies.*72
5. Responsive engagement.
Fifth, "responsive engagement" involves a rich set of regulatory dialogues
that could potentially result in a certain level of compromise even though the
negotiation is not completely successful. Although responsive engagement
reaches less than the desired outcome, the process of engaging itself moves the
network forward. It signals that the parties are willing to cooperate, at least on
some issues, even if they are unsuccessful on others for the time being. Given
that network operation is a dynamic and incremental process, responsive
engagement is critical in maintaining a stable level of sociological momentum
regardless of any regulatory deal. In other words, the network process is not a
binary (on/off) communication, but a thread of self-reinforcing engagement.
70

See Ronald S. Burt, Corporate Profits and Cooptadon:Networks ofMarket Constraints and DirectorateTies

71

in the American Economy 5 (Academic 1983).
Cho, 39 Harv Intl LJ at 346 n 188 (cited in note 58).

72

See Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power andPrinaple:AnIntegrated Theoy ofInternationalLaw, 72 U Chi
L Rev 469, 504 (2005) (arguing that one of the collateral consequences of international
organization membership, and commitment to its attendant obligations, shapes the way other
actors, states, NGOs, and domestic individuals view the state).
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When this interaction reaches a critical point, a regulatory product, be it an
MOU or a policy guideline, tends to materialize.
6. Expert sympathization.
Finally, a preliminary regulatory product molded initially by a bilateral
dialogue between A and B may spill over and be multilateralized through likeminded regulators from other jurisdictions. This "expert sympathization" is a
necessary step in formulating any common regulatory guidelines or principles
within a government network. This type of intra-network dynamics can be
found in most networks, such as the BCBS or the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO), that produce policy guidelines or recommendations on a
regular basis.
Importantly, these six types of intra-network dynamics offer useful
analytical lenses through which one can understand how a TRN functions in an
incremental, dialogical, and norm-generating manner. These tools are inherently
incremental-some modes are intermediary steps in others. For example,
persuasion might lead to willing marginalization. Responsive engagement is a
step in negotiation. These dynamics comprise the very dialogue of the TRNs.
They are the substance of conferences, informal talks, and telephone calls. They
are the constituent parts of both the substantive outcomes and the process of
bringing the networks together. Eventually, these dynamics facilitate the normgenerating process. They result in normative end products.
C. End Products: Regulatory Prototypes
TRNs create end products, which we label "regulatory prototypes." They
generate rules, norms, or standards to deal with specific problems they face. The

7

Other scholars have employed different terms. See, for example, Zaring, 33 Tex Intl L J at 303 n
188 (cited in note 39), citing Hal S. Scott, The Competitive Implications of the Basle CapitalAccord, 39
SLU L J 885, 885 (1995) (referring to the Basel Accord as a "gentlemen's agreement among
central banks"); Joseph Jude Norton, Devising InternationalBank Supervisory Standards 176-77, 25562 (Martinus Nijhoff 1995); Zaring, 33 Tex Intl at 303 n 189 (cited in note 39) ("international soft
law"). For another perspective, see Linda M. Harasim, GlobalNetworks:An Introduction, in Linda M.
Harasim, ed, Global Networks: Computers and International Communication 3, 13-14 (MIT 1993)
(introducing chapter nineteen of the book, written by Shumpei Kumon and Izumi Aizu). Kumon
and Aizu propose "co-emulation" as a strategy for developing a global hypernetwork society of
the future. To them, co-emulation is a "response to the information age whereby nations can
learn from one another to produce a prototype socio-economic model that each country can
mold to fit its unique history and culture," and it encourages nations to "move beyond
competitive relationships into more consensual... relationships" to address a variety of socioeconomic challenges of the twenty-first century. Id. See also Eibe Riedel, Standards and Sources:
Farewell to the Exclusivity of the Sources Triad in International Law?, 2 Eur J Intl L 58, 79 (1991)
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regulatory prototype often comes in the form of a guideline or recommendation,
which are typical features of international "soft law." These end products
logically flow from the network operation that is dialogical, incremental, and
norm-generating."4 They fulfill the goals of the framework or blueprint
established by the coordinating states.
A regulatory prototype, such as a guideline or a policy recommendation,
tends to represent a converging output of networking results. Considering the
networking's incremental nature, any hasty attempt to accomplish quick
regulatory outcome will be futile, or even counterproductive. 5 Yet this
circumspection does not necessarily mean that a TRN always deters participants
from voluntarily adopting a regulatory position that is more advanced than the
TRN's initial regulatory prototype." As discussed above, a variety of intranetwork dynamics, such as persuasion and responsive engagement, encourage
network participants to espouse "best practices," "regulatory benchmarks," or
"regulatory checklists," which may even exceed the least common denominators,
so as speedily to achieve necessary regulatory goals. While the regulatory
prototype is nonbinding,78 it also tends to be technical and precise.7 1
(discussing "new
transactions).

economic standards" with

the proliferation of international

economic

74

This process can also be viewed as "dialectical" in the sense that this process illustrates how
prototypes can eventually be transformed into more acceptable-and in a sense more
legitimate-norms than ones found in a conventional treaty. This dialectical process represents
the whole life cycle of a regulatory prototype throughout the sequence of its creation,
nationalization (where necessary), enforcement, surveillance, feedback, and establishment of a
new prototype.

75

Cho, RethinkingAPEC at 403 (cited in note 22). For instance, the OECD Recommendation Concerning
Effective Action Against 'lard Core' Cartels represents a minimum common denominator ("hard
core" cartels) in the competition policy area that results from a long-standing networking in this
regulatory field centering on the OECD Committee on Competition Law and Policy, which
brings together the leaders of the world's major competition, or antitrust, authorities and provides
the chief international forum for the regular exchange of views on important competition policy
issues. OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, Competition Law and Pokey: About,
(visited Oct
online at http://www.oecd.org/about/0,3347,en_2649_34685_1_1_1_1_1,00.html
15, 2011). See also OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, Recommendation
at
online
Cartels,
Core
Hard
against
Action
Effective
Concerning
http://www.oecd.org/document/19/0,3746,en_2649_40381615_44942291_1_1_11,00.html
(visited Oct 15, 2011).

76

Cho, Rethinking APEC at 404 (cited in note 22).

77

OECD,
The OECD Reference Checklist for Regulatory Dedsion-Making, online at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/20/10/35220214.pdf (visited Oct 15, 2011). However, such
"best practices" are not necessarily made either for the sake of harmonization or to generate
regulatory competition that would create a higher level of regulatory quality (a "race-to-the-top"
scenario). Best practices are just used as an example or a reference for a future design of a
regulation. It should be noted that under some circumstances, "regulatory diversity" would be a
better option than harmonization or any other type of regulatory cooperation since the diversity
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Empirical confirmations of regulatory prototypes are legion. For example,
the Basel Core Princiblesfor Effective Banking Supervision, released by the BCBS on
September 22, 1997, were intended to "serve as a basic reference" for banking
authorities throughout the world in supervising and regulating banks and
banking activities within their jurisdictions."0 Likewise, principles included in the
Resolution on the Supervision of Financial Conglomerates designed by IOSCO in
October 1992 "form the basis for the risk assessment of financial
conglomerates" and should "guide the development of regulatory practice. . . in
the area of financial conglomerates."' The APEC network serves as another
example. One of the most representative sectors in the APEC in which such
guidelines and principles proliferate is the "standards and conformances" sector.
The Sub-Committee on Standards and Conformance8 2 completed Guidelines for
the Preparation,Adoption and Review of Technical Regulations and APEC Food MRA
(MutualRecognition Arrangement) Supplementary Materialin 1997." Regardless of its

78

of preference, such as the degree of risk-taking, is sometimes irreconcilable. Scott H. Jacobs,
RegulatoU Co-Operationfor an Interdependent World: Issuesfor Government, in Regulatoy Co-Operation 15,
33 (cited in note 39). For another perspective, see David Vogel, Trading Up: Consumer and
Environmental Regulation in a Global Economy 6 (Harvard 1995) (discussing the so-called "California
effect," which means an upward regulatory competition in the environmental policies among
trading states in the US).
See OECD Working Party of the Trade Committee, Regulatoy Reform and International
Standardisation **28-32 (1999), online at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/19/1955309.pdf
(visited Oct 15, 2011) (discussing "regulators as players in standardisation").

79

Cho, Rethinking APEC at 403 (cited in note 22).

so

BIS, Core Prinzles for Effective Banking Supervision (Sept 22,
1997), online at
http://www.bis.org/press/p970922.htm (visited Oct 15, 2011).
IOSCO, A Resolution on the Supervision of Financial Conglomerates (1992), online at
http://www.iosco.org/library/resolutions/pdf/IOSCORES7.pdf (visited Oct 15, 2011). More
recently, the IOSCO documented a comprehensive set of thirty principles of securities
regulations, which are based on three fundamental objectives of securities regulation: the
protection of investors; ensuring that markets are fair, efficient, and transparent; and the
reduction of systemic risk. IOSCO, Objectives and Prinafles of Securities Regulation *i (2003), online at
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD154.pdf (visited Oct 15, 2011). These
thirty principles-grouped into eight categories (principles relating to the regulator, principles for
self-regulations, principles for the enforcement of securities regulation, principles for cooperation
in regulation, principles for issuers, principles for collective investment schemes, principles for
market intermediaries, principles for the secondary market)-are to be nationalized in due forms
considering domestic legal structure and other circumstances. Id at **i-iii.
The Sub-Committee on Standards and Conformance (SCSC) was established under the APEC
Committee on Trade and Investment (CTI), among other things, to encourage alignment of
members' standards with international standards and to achieve mutual recognition among APEC
economies of conformity assessment in regulated and voluntary sectors. See APEC, Sub-Committee
on Standards and Conformance, online at http://www.apec.org/Groups/Committee-on-Trade-andInvestment/Sub-Committee-on-Standards-and-Conformance.aspx (visited Oct 15, 2011).

81

82

83

Id.
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technical format, the normative value of this prototype can be advanced by the
very fact that expert participants of the network, sharing a common belief, have
worked out this prototype via various modes of dynamics.84
Guidelines or recommendation prototypes are designed to be
nationalized. 5 Under certain circumstances, a soft law prototype may be
rendered into hard law as a part (or a whole) of a statute in the domestic legal
system." Notably, certain TRNs provide a variety of strategies to encourage

8

85

86

See also Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy at 181-84 (cited in note 20) (arguing for
effectiveness of the Basel Committee's system of enforcement despite its informality). In this
sense, one might reasonably speculate that such a prototype (soft law) would form a new pattern
of "custom" in terms of public international law since the requirements of both established
practice and opinio juris would be met because transgovernmental regulators regularly refer to
those prototypes with a strong normative attitude regardless of the fact that it is technically nonbinding. See Stephen Zamora, Is There Customary InternationalEconomic Law?, 32 German YB Intl L
9, 34-35 (1989) (discussing the "soft law" nature of customary international economic law). As a
matter of fact, this regulatory prototype corresponds to the current reality of harmonization as
seen, for example, in the EU context. Contemporary regulatory harmonization is conducted not
in light of "specification" standards, but in light of "performance" standards. Giandomenico
Majone, Compating Strateges of Regulator Rapprchement in Regulator Co-Operaion 155, 163-65 (cited
in note 39). In other words, instead of attempting to universalize regulatory standards based on
detailed specifications, certain "essential requirements" based on functions or performances are
highlighted. Id. Regarding the "New Approach" to technical harmonization and standardization,
see generally European Commission, Guide to the Implementation of Direcives Based on the New
Approach and the GlobalApproach (2000), online at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/singlemarket-goods/files/blue-guide/guidepublic.en.pdf (visited Oct 15, 2011). In turn, this approach,
focusing on essential requirements, provides ample room for regulatory maneuvering in the
implementation stage on a case-by-case basis. Id at 7. Accordingly, the concept of "equivalency"
becomes critical in assessing regulations of different jurisdictions and in determining whether a
certain regulation is compatible with a harmonized standard. See, for example, Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay
Round vol 1, Annex 1A, 1867 UN Treaty Ser 493, Arts 4-6 (1994). This determination is called a
"conformity assessment" process. See European Commission, Guide at 8 (cited in note 84)
(regarding the "Global Approach" to certification and testing related to conformity assessment).
Therefore, regulatory prototypes symbolize the current harmonization practices in the sense that
they represent essential regulatory requirements as principles or guidelines and implementation
details are left to each domestic authority. Zaring, 46 Colum J Transnatl L at 580-87 (cited in note
2).
Slaughter submits that this "nationalization of international law" is an important dimension of
effectiveness of government networks. She argues that "[t]he result is an international rule-making
process that directly engages national officials and national promulgation and enforcement
mechanisms, without formal translation and implementation mechanisms from the international
to the national." Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy at 189 (cited in note 20). See also Roberta
S. Karmel and Claire R. Kelly, The Hardening of Soft Law in Securities Regulation, 34 Brooklyn J Intl L
883, 919-24 (2009).
Malloy emphasized the importance of such "hardening" process's crystallizing into
implementation and enforcement. Regarding the BIS capital adequacy guidelines and the Second
Banking Directive in the EC, he argues that successful implementation and enforcement of these
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participants to implement and enforce these prototypes domestically. For
example, they request participants to perform self-evaluations to monitor their
compliance with those prototypes.87
Interestingly, these soft prototypes can also become hard law through the
subsequent treaty-making process. As Kal Raustiala aptly observes, "Soft law is
often seen as a stepping-stone to hard . . . law, permitting states to begin

cooperation informally when they fear the impact of a fully legally binding
commitment."" This soft-law-turned-treaty phenomenon makes sense
considering the fact that treaties often support the formation of networks by
supplying them with political support (in terms of acceptance or acquiescence of
network phenomena) as well as institutional support (in terms of personnel and
budget).8

87

88
89

two initiatives may provide the basis for the future development of a "strong force" converged
pattern of regulation. Michael P. Malloy, Bumper Cars: Themes of Convergence in InternationalRegulation,
60 Fordham L Rev S1, S19-21 (1992). However, the hardening process may be hard in a
constitutional matter because many supervisory authorities, for example, central banks, may not
have legislative competence to convert those guidelines or principles into a hard statute. BIS, Core
Pringilesfor Effective Banking Supervision (cited in note 80). Nonetheless, the Basel Committee keeps
on monitoring the application of such principles "in all material aspects" and indirectly presses
domestic legislators to harden such soft laws. Id.
See, for example, IOSCO, Report on the Se/f-Evaluation Conducted by IOSCO Members Pursuant to the
1994 IOSCO Resolution on 'Commitment to Basic IOSCO Principles of High Regulatory Standards
online
at
(Nov
1997),
Assistance "
Cooperation
and
and
Mutual
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD76.pdf (visited Oct 15, 2011).
Raustiala, 43 Va J Intl L at 86 (cited in note 22). See also Karmel and Kelly, 34 Brooklyn J Intl L
at 920-24 (cited in note 85).
Raustiala, 43 Va J Intl L at 88 (cited in note 22). In sum, two dominant courses may encapsulate
the soft norm-generating mechanism within a government network. First, a contextualized rule (a
rule that depends on the circumstance, such as a particular national regulation) may get
decontextualized as its core precepts (general principles) are abstracted. As an initial normative
reference, those contextualized norms are often labeled "best practices" or "templates." Second,
network participants discuss and debate these de-contextualized rules (principles) and establish a
regulatory prototype. This prototype is a "model" for future application-for example, maybe a
model law on cross-border insolvency. This prototype can then be re-contextualized or
nationalized later in each jurisdiction through various transmission mechanisms. For example, it
can be transformed into a domestic statute (from soft to hard) or a domestic administrative
guideline (from soft to soft). See R.Y. Jennings, The Progress ofInternationalLaw:AnInauguralLecture
48 (Cambridge 1960) (stating that "[d]evelopment of the law may indeed at first seem to make the
law less rather than more certain for it is not unlike metal being tempered for a new purpose, and
may have to be softened before it can be reshaped and hardened"). For another perspective, see
Jonathan I. Charney, UniversalInternationalLaw, 87 AmJ Intl L 529, 551 (1993) (arguing that "[t]he
augmented role of multilateral forums in devising, launching, refining and promoting general
international law has provided the international community with a more formal lawmaking
process that is used often"). Of course, after this re-contextualization, feedback can also help
shape the original prototype to further improve.
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IV. COORDINATING NETWORKS: THE G20 AS A CASE STUDY
The G20 Leaders evolved from a rather mundane network of finance
ministers into a unique group of leaders functioning as an executive coordinator
of a response to the financial crisis of 2008." The G20 Leaders coordinate the
activities of the banking and finance ministers, the securities commissioners, the
insurance network, and the trade network. Chronicling the G20's development
as a TRN coordinator, and reviewing its coordination of these various issuespecific networks, allows us to view examples of intra-network dynamics and
raise questions concerning the implications of these dynamics. What is new to us
concerns the unique "executive" role self-imposed by the G20 to steer this
largely discrete set of sector-specific TRNs in a coherent fashion under a longterm time-horizon. We explore the implications of this coordination in light of
the network dynamics at play in the TRNs in this Section.
A. The Evolution of the G20 Into a Coordinating Executive
For some time, groups of countries have coordinated both economic and
foreign affairs policies using periodic meetings of high level officials. These "G"
(for Group) meetings started in the 1970s with the G5 (France, Germany, Japan,
the UK, and the US), and involved heads of state discussing financial and
economic matters. 9' This group expanded to the G7 in the 1980s by adding
Canada and Italy. Russia joined the group, leading to the G8 in 1998, at least for
economic matters.9 2 In 1999, partially in response to the Asian financial crisis,

90

91
92

The Group of 20 or G20 refers to a group of finance ministers and central bank governors from
nineteen countries and the EU that was established in 1999. The G20 is an informal forum that
promotes open and constructive discussion between systemically important industrial and
emerging-market countries on key issues involving global economic stability. The G20 represents
around 90 percent of global gross national product; this economic weight, along with its broad
membership, gives the G20 legitimacy and influence in the management of the global financial
system and economy. The G20 has no permanent staff but has rotating chairs. The chairs rotate
between members each year and establish a temporary secretariat, which coordinates the group's
at
G-20,
online
the
What
is
G20,
meetings.
and
work
http://www.g20.org/about-what-is-g20.aspx (visited Oct 15, 2011).
Peter I. Hajnal, The G8 System and the G20: Evolution, Role and Documentation 12 (Ashgate 2007).
Id at 28. In terms of economic matter discussed, the group dealt with issues such as exchange
rates and balance of payments. See, for example, Declaration of Rambouillet (Nov 17, 1975) online at
(visited Oct 15, 2011);
http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/1975rambouillet/communique.htm
Announcement of the Ministers of Finance and CentralBank Governors of France, Germany, Japan, the United
at
1985),
online
22,
United States (PlaZa Accord) (Sept
Kingdom, and the
http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/finance/fm850922.htm (visited Oct 15, 2011); Statement of the G6
Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (Loure Accord) (Feb 22, 1987), online at
http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/finance/fm870222.htm (visited Oct 15, 2011).
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the G20" formed in order to bring together finance ministers and central bank
governors from both developed and emerging economies.9 4 Notably, unlike the
G7 meetings, the G20 meetings were originally conducted by the finance
ministers of the various participants, not the heads of state." The G20 structure
emphasized the importance of emerging economies in global economic issues."
97
The finance ministers and central bank governors typically met once a year.
After the Asian financial crisis of 1999 and prior to the 2008 financial
crisis, the finance ministers and central bank governors met regularly." These
meetings addressed issues such as financial-sector regulation and supervision,"
prevention of terrorist financing,o and the reform of the Bretton Woods
institutions."0 o An important turning point for the prominence and future of the

93

The members of the G20 are: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany,
India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, UK,
US, and the EU. The EU is represented by the President of the European Council, the President
of the European Commission, and the head of the European Central Bank. G20, What is the G-20
(cited in note 90). Additionally Spain and the Netherlands have attended as observers. The
following organizations have also attended as observers: the European Commission, the
European Council, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Financial Stability
Board (FSB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the New Partnership for Africa's
Development (NEPAD), the UN, the World Bank, and the WTO. Jenilee Guebert, Plansfor the
Third G20 Summit: Pittsburgh 2009, **44-45 (G-20 Research Group 2009), online at
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/g20plans/g20leaders090818.pdf (visited Oct 15, 2011).

94

See G20, G20 Home, online at http://www.g20.org (visited Oct 15, 2011).

95

See Rebecca M. Nelson, The G-20 and InternationalEconomic Cooperation: Background and Implications

for Congress *1 (Cong Rsrch Serv Aug 10, 2010), online at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40977.pdf
96

97

(visited Oct 15, 2011).
Id at **3-4 (noting that emerging economies have become more "active in the international
economy").
G20, What is the G-20 (cited in note 90) (discussing the normal practices for meetings and
activities).

98

Initially the G20 started out as the G22 and was formed for a one-time meeting. It briefly became
the G33 and finally upon the recommendation of the G7 finance ministers became the G20. See
Hajnal, The G8 System and the G20 at 151-52 (cited in note 91). See also G20, Communiqu: G-20
Finance
Ministers
and
Central
Bank
Governors
(1999),
online
at
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/1999/1999communique.pdf (visited Oct 15, 2011) (Communiqud
1999). Deputies meet twice a year to prepare for the ministerial meeting. See Hajnal, The G8 System
and the G20 at 1 (cited in note 91). The G20 also organizes various technical seminars throughout
the year. Id. The meetings are not open to the public.

9

See Communiqui 1999 (cited in note 98).

10

G20, Communiqud: G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (2001), online at
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2001/2001communique.pdf
(visited Oct 15,
2011); G20,
Communiqui: Meeting of Ministers and Governors in Melbourne (2006),
online at
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2006/2006communique.pdf (visited Oct 15, 2011).

101 G20, Communique: Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (2005), online at
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2005/2005communique.pdf (visited Oct 15, 2011).
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G20 came with the 2008 financial crisis. As the crisis deepened, the G7 leaders
decided to convene a "summit" of the leaders of the G20 countries. In 2008,
then-US President George W. Bush called for the first G20 Leaders Summit to
be held in Washington, DC.'02 Since the first summit in November 2008 in
Washington, there have been five others: London (2009), Pittsburgh (2009),
Toronto (2010), Seoul (2010), and Cannes (2011). "[The G20 leaders [will]
begin meeting once annually, in the fall, beginning in France in 2011. Mexico
will chair the G20 in 2012."103
The first three G20 Summits moved the group from a crisis responder to a
premier economic institutional forum.104 The first summit focused on "short and
medium term responses to the crisis;"' the second reached agreement on crisis
management; and the third created a "new framework to correct global
imbalances, taking steps to address food security issues, and eliminating fossil
fuel subsidies."' The third and fourth summits, in particular, solidified the G20
network as an executive coordinator of international economic policy-making
and began a process of extending its reach to other non-financial issue areas for
sustainable development, such as energy policy and food security.

102

103

Alan S. Alexandroff and John Kirton, The "Great Recession" and the Emergence of the G-20 Leaders'
Summit, in Alan S. Alexandroff and Andrew F. Cooper, eds, Rising States, Rising Institutions:
Challengesfor Global Governance 177, 180 (Brookings 2010).
John
Kirton,
What
is
the
G20?
(G20
Information
Centre),
online
at
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/g20whatisit.html (visited Oct 15, 2011).

104

See Nelson, The G-20 and InternationalEconomic Cooperation at 1 (cited in note 95). Foreign policy
issues remain the purview of the G7 and G8.

105

Rebecca M. Nelson, The G-20 and InternationalEconomic Cooperation: Background and Implationsfor
at
online
Serv
2009),
Rsrch
*1
(Cong
Congress
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40977_20091209.pdf (visited Oct 18, 2011).

106

Id. See also, for example, G20, The G-20 Toronto Summit Declaration Preamble, 1 9 (2010), online at
http://www.g20.org/Documents/g20_declaration-en.pdf (visited Oct 16, 2011) (Toronto Summit
51(e), 58 (2010), online at
Declaration). See also, G20, The G-20 Seoul Summit Declaration,
http://www.g20.org/Documents2010/11/seoulsummit declaration.pdf (visited Oct 16, 2011)
(Seoul Summit Declaration) (discussing an enhanced food security policy and the phase-out of fossil
fuel subsidies, respectively); Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Rebecca Harms, Outcome of the G20 Summit in
Pittsburgh (24-25 September 2009) (European Free Alliance Sept 29, 2009), online at
http://www.greens-efa.eu/fr/outcome-of-the-g20-summit-in-pittsburgh-24-25-september-20091238.html (visited Oct 15, 2011) (discussing the framework for green and global recovery);
24 (2009), online at
39, Preamble
Leaders' Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit,
http://www.g20.org/Documents/pittsburghsummit leadersstatement_250909.pdf (visited Oct
16, 2011) (The Pittsburgh Summi); The White House, The G-20 Summit in Toronto: Acting on Our
27,
2010),
online
at
Change
Challenges
(June
Global Enegy
and
Chmate
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/g-20-summit-toronto-acting-our-global-energyand-climate-change-challenges (visited Oct 16, 2011) (discussing the background of the Pittsburgh
Summit).
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Notably, each of the Leaders Summits displayed the G20's utilization of
previously established TRNs to an incrementally increasing degree. The
Washington Summit (2008) dealt with crisis management.107 The leaders agreed
to commit "sufficient resources" to the IMF, World Bank, and other
development banks so that these institutions could adequately respond to the
crisis.'os While the participants had varying views on the need for a new global
financial architecture and its shape, they finally hammered out one version.
The European view favored a relatively comprehensive international financial
architecture, while the US and Canada envisioned a relatively gradual process of
coordination.' Discussion between the IMF and the Financial Stability Forum
(FSF) resulted in a division of labor and the expansion of the FSF."' The leaders
sought to stabilize the financial system, recognize the importance of stimulus to
the economy, and to "[ejnsure that the IMF, World Bank and other [multilateral
development banks] have sufficient resources to continue playing their role in
overcoming the crisis." 1 2 As part of the new blueprint, the leaders committed to
implement policies consistent with an array of broad yet common principles."'
The principles included strengthening transparency and accountability,114
enhancing sound regulation,"' promoting integrity in financial markets,"'
reinforcing international cooperation,"' and reforming international financial
107

See G20, Declaration of the Summit on FinancialMarkets and the World Economy, 2 (Nov 15, 2008),
online at www.g20.org/Documents/g20 summit-declaration.pdf (visited Oct 15, 2011)
(Washington Declaration).

108

Id at

109

Id.

110

Alexandroff and Kirton, The Great Recession at 181 (cited in note 102).

It1

Washington Declaration,T 9 (cited in note 107). As Alexandroff and Kirton explained, the plan was
to have a lightly institutionalized Financial Stability Forum (FSF) that would set new standards
and the organizationally powerful IMF would then monitor and enforce compliance with them.
Alexandroff and Kirton, The Great Recession at 182 (cited in note 102).
Washington Declaration, 9 (cited in note 107).

112
113
114

115

116

117

7.

Id at % 8-9 (discussing the Common Principles for Reform of Financial Markets).
This mainly entails "enhancing required disclosure on complex financial products and ensuring
complete and accurate disclosure by firms of their financial conditions. Incentives should be
aligned to avoid excessive risk-taking." Id at 9.
This measure is aimed at "strengthen[ing] our regulatory regimes, prudential oversight, and risk
management, and ensur[ing] that all financial markets, products and participants are regulated or
subject to oversight, as appropriate to their circumstances." Id.
This aims primarily at "bolstering investor and consumer protection, avoiding conflicts of
interest, preventing illegal market manipulation, fraudulent activities and abuse, and protecting
against illicit finance risks arising from non-cooperative jurisdictions." Washington Declaration, 9
(cited in note 107).
This will facilitate "coordination and cooperation across all segments of financial markets,
including with respect to cross-border capital flows." Id.
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institutions."' To implement these principles for reform, the leaders set out an

action plan that contained immediate and medium-term items with more
specificity."'
At the London Summit (2009), the theme of crisis management continued,
but the group also set goals for long-term planning and policy coordination.' 2 0
Given the more long-term view at this summit, it is not surprising that some
divergence in policy perspectives and priorities emerged. For example, the US
focused its attention primarily on stimulus while the EU sought better global
regulation.12' Emerging powers sought progress on "trade openness, trade
finance, development, and reform of international financial institutions."1 22 Still
other powers, including the UK, broached the subject of adding climate change
to the talks.123
Despite these divides, the summit was a success because the G20
maintained its role as an executive coordinator and orchestrated a response to

11S

The goal is "reform of the Bretton Woods Institutions so that they can more adequately reflect
changing economic weights in the world economy in order to increase their legitimacy and
effectiveness.... [E]merging and developing economies, including the poorest countries, should
have greater voice and representation." Id.

119
120

See generally id, Action Plan.

122

Alexandroff and Kirton, The "GreatRecession" at 185 (cited in note 102); Lee Hudson Teslik, Twenty
online
at
1,
2009),
Foreign
Rel
Apr
(Council
on
at
G-20
Agendas
http://www.cfr.org/publication/I 8997/twenty-agendasat g20.html (visited Oct 16, 2011).
Gordon Brown, Supporting Global Growth: A Prekminay Report on the Responsiveness and Adaptability of
online
at
7
(2009),
**3,
Financial
Institutions,
International
the
(visited
http://www.g20.org/Documents/cabinet-office-supportingglobal-growth_0909.pdf
Oct 16, 2011) (discussing climate change).

G20,

The Global Plan for RecoveU and Reform, $$ 2, 4 (2009),
online at
http://www.g20.org/Documents/final-communique.pdf (visited Oct 15, 2011) (Recovery and
Reform).
121 See, for example, Rich Miller and Simon Kennedy, G-20 Shapes New World Order With Lesser Role
online
at
Apr
2,
2009),
for
U.S.,
Markets
(Bloomberg
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=axEnbLXw5yc&refer=home
(visited Oct 15, 2011) (discussing the US' taking the lead in getting the summit to agree on an
increase in IMF rescue funds to $750 billion from $250 billion); Associated Foreign Press, G20
Needs to Act Action on Global FinancialCrisis: Analysts (WAtoday (Austl) Apr 1, 2009), online at
http://www.watoday.com.au/world/g20-needs-to-act-action-on-global-financial-crisis-analysts20090401-9jor.htnl (visited Oct 15, 2011) (discussing the divide between US and Europe); Steve
Richards, Woolly Words Expose Weakness of Leaders' Convictions (Independent Apr 2, 2009), online at
http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/steve-richards/steve-richards-woolywords-expose-weakness-of- leaders-conviction s-1659990.html (visited Oct 15, 2011) (discussing
Brown's and Obama's uncertainties going into the summit); Jose Manuel Durlo Barroso,
Declaration on the Preparationof the G20 Summit (Mar 24, 2009), online at http://wwweuropa-euun.org/articles/en/article_8601_en.htm (visited Oct 15, 2011) (illustrating EU's urging for a
global response).

123

520

Vol. 12 No. 2

Cho and Kel

Promises and Perils ofNew GlobalGovernance

the crisis. 12 4 The leaders laid a framework or blueprint for the various sectorspecific networks, such as the banking and securities networks, to follow as they
develop more specific regulatory prototypes with which to achieve
corresponding regulatory goals. For example, the leaders facilitated the operation
of a financial network by creating the Financial Stability Board (FSB) as the
successor to the FSF.12 The FSB was asked to partner with the IMF as a
monitoring entity.'26 The G20 also agreed to increase funding for the IMF.12 7 It
endorsed the OECD efforts to "take action against non-cooperative
jurisdictions, including tax havens."' 28 It again called on accounting bodies to
coordinate with supervisors and regulators to improve standards.'29
Furthermore, participants at the London Summit committed to concluding the
Doha Round,' a commitment on which the G20 later reneged, 13' then they
reasserted,' 32 and finally they reaffirmed.'3 3 It also reaffirmed the commitment to
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http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/CH%20London%20to%/20Laquila%20WEB.pdf
(visited Oct 16, 2011).
Recovey and Reform, 1 15 (cited in note 120); FSB, About the FSB: HistoU, online at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/history.htm (visited Oct 16, 2011).
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15.

23. The Leaders saw the importance of not only confronting the present crisis but of
forestalling protectionist policies that could worsen it. At the London Summit, the G20 asked the
WTO along with UNCTAD and the OECD to "monitor and report publicly on G20 adherence
to their undertakings on resisting protectionism and promoting global trade and investment." See
OECD, WTO, UNCTAD, Report on G20 Trade and Investment Measures *3 (2009), online at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wto-oecd-unctad2009 en.pdf (visited Oct 16, 2011); OECD,
WTO, UNCTAD, Report on G20 Trade and Investment Measures (September 2009 to Februay 2010)
(2010), online at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wtooecd unctad20l0dl-en.pdf (visited Oct
16,2011).
131 IDG Gap Task Force, The Global Partnersbpfor Development at a CriticalJuncture31 (United Nations
at
online
2010),
2
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/mdg-gap/mdggap20lO/mdg8report 010len
gw.pdf (visited Oct 16, 2011) ("Mhe goal set by the G-20 to conclude the negotiations in 2010
appears unrealizable, and no new deadline has been set.").
132 Toronto Summit Declaration, 38 (cited in note 106).
133 Seoul Summit Declaration, 43 (cited in note 106).
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reach the Millennium Development Goals13 and to work towards a successful
plan to cope with climate change."'
The Progress Report following the London Summit attests to the G20's
efforts to harness the resources of various TRNs. With the ongoing prompting
and guidance of the G20, these networks kept generating various regulatory
prototypes. For example, the BCBS issued final capital requirements standards
for resecuritizations and enhanced risk management requirements around
structured products and off-balance sheet activities.' 36 IOSCO published interim
recommendations about regulatory approaches to be implemented in the
securitization markets.'3 7 Subsequently, IOSCO finalized its report on Good
Practices in Relation to Investment Managers Due Diligence When Investing in Structured
31
Finance Instruments.1
Motivated by the success of the London Summit, the Pittsburgh Summit
The leaders officially
(2009) resulted in even more ambitious blueprints.'
ordained the G20 as the premier forum for international economic
coordination.'4o They stressed the importance of increasing the representation of
emerging-market countries at the IMF,14 ' as well as making specific
commitments on a host of new policy areas, including economic development
and the environment.142 In addition to reforming the IMF, the Summit
announced plans for reform of the development banks. Specifically, the G20
called upon the World Bank to strengthen its focus on food security, human

134

Recovery and Reform, T 25 (cited in note 120).

135

Id at T 28.
G20, Progress Report on the Actions of the London and Washington G20 Summits, T 48 (2009), online at
http://www.g20.org/Documents/20090905-G20-progress-update_.London Fin_Mins-final.pdf
(visited Oct 16, 2011) (London and Washington Progress Reporl. For the prototypes, see BCBS,
online
2009),
(July
Framework
II
Basel
the
to
Enhancements
at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl57.pdf (visited Oct 20, 2011); BCBS, Revisions to the Basel II
Market Risk Framework (July 2009), online at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl58.pdf (visited Oct
20, 2011); BCBS, Guidelines for Computing Capital Risk in the Trading Book (July 2009), online
at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl59.pdf (visited Oct 20, 2011).
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See G20, Progress Report, T 48 (cited in note 137); IOSCO, UnregulatedFinancialMarkets and Products
(2009), online at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD290.pdf (visited Oct 20,
2011).
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at
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(2009),
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http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD300.pdf (visited Oct 20, 2011).
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development, economic growth for the poor, and financing a green economy.143
The emphasis of the Leaders' Statement was on forward-looking, sustainable
development, launching the Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced
Growth.1" In ushering in these ambitious blueprints, the G20 leaders attempted
to coordinate, cross-link, and manage various networks and entities. For
example, leaders
ask[ed] the IMF to assist our Finance Ministers and Central Bank
Governors in this process of mutual assessment by developing a forwardlooking analysis of whether policies pursued by individual G-20 countries
are collectively consistent with more sustainable and balanced trajectories
for the global economy, and to report regularly to both the G-20 and the
International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC), building on the
IMF's existing bilateral and multilateral surveillance analysis, on global
economic developments, patterns of growth and suggested policy
adjustments. Our Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors will
elaborate this process at their November meeting and we will review the
results of the first mutual assessment at our next summit. 145
With respect to its efforts on energy and sustainable development, the G20
tapped into pre-existing entities. "We request relevant institutions, such as the
IEA, OPEC, OECD, and World Bank, provide an analysis of the scope of
energy subsidies and suggestions for the implementation of this initiative and
report back at the next summit."14 6
The G20 progress reports play an important role in "monitoring" and
moving blueprints forward. The progress reports closely detail the work of
BCBS, the FSB, the finance ministers, IAIS, IOSCO, IASB, and the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS), among others.147 For example, one progress
report notes the pressing need for supervision and monitoring by nearly every
network to combat systemic risk. 14 8 It chronicles various TRN efforts, such as
the IOSCO's Objectives and Principlesof Securities Regulation (recognizing the need to
confront systemic risk); the BCBS's investigation of systemic funding liquidity
risks; the FSB's and IMF's monitoring of data gaps; and the IAIS's beginning
investigation of systemic risks. 149

143
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144
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145
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148
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The Toronto Summit (2010) reaffirmed the G20's role as a premier forum
for international economic cooperation."so By accepting the recommendations
from labor and employment ministers who had met in April,'"' the G20
demonstrated that it considered social implications of economic growth and
development. It also marked the completion of a peer review mechanism, the
Mutual Assessment Process (MAP),'5 under which the G20 can collectively
evaluate each member's record of compliance with previous blueprints and
regulatory prototypes. Relying upon IMF and World Bank assessments, the
leaders suggested that a more ambitious plan would result in a speedier, more
sustainable, and more equitable recovery.'53 Leaders agreed to "at least halve
deficits by 2013 and stabilize or reduce government debt-to-GDP ratios by
2016."154
The evaluation of the Seoul Summit (2010) has been mixed. One of the
pressing issues facing the leaders was currency imbalances; the summit failed to
deliver a solution, although participants did pledge to develop prescriptive
guidelines to address global imbalances.'"' Nonetheless, some critics have noted
that the summit eased tensions amongst countries over quantitative easing and
currency devaluation.'1 6 Given the incremental nature of the G20 operation, one
might not be too disappointed with these efforts. Moreover, there were some
additional concrete accomplishments that built upon prior work."' In particular,

150
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I (cited in note 106).

151 Id at Preamble T 5.

152
153

IMF, Factsheet: The G-20 Mutual Assessment Process (MAP) (2011),
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/g20map.htm (visited Oct 16, 2011).
Toronto Summit Declaration at Preamble 9 (cited in note 106).
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at
2010),
online
12,
Nov
(The
Australian
Imbalances
Trade
Currencies,
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16,
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(visited
on-currencies-trade-imbalances/story-e6frg926-1225952694281
Chakravarthi Raghavan, G20 Summit: No Accord on 'Curreny Values' or Imbalances, 244 Third World
Resurgence 4 (discussing how the November 11-12 Seoul Summit was unable to establish a
solution to the differences on currency values or global imbalances but agreed to develop
guidelines).
See G20 Agree to Move toward More Market-Driven Exchange Rate (CRI English Nov 12, 2010), online
at http://english.cri.cn/6826/2010/11/12/2741s604727.htm (visited Oct 16, 2011) (noting that
the Seoul Summit was held amid tensions among G20 nations on several issues, but the nations
were able to find agreement on many controversial issues).
Preparaionsfor the G20 Seoul Summit in November and its Agenda (Kor IT Times May 10, 2010), online
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the Summit officially endorsed Basel III and emphasized the continued
importance of macro-prudential frameworks such as the IMF's MAP."58
The Seoul Summit perhaps best highlights both the successes and the
limitations of the G20 in coordinating the many diverse networks at its disposal.
It is true that the G20 was instrumental in merging its considerable political will
and professional expertise during times of crisis. At the same time, however, the
networks at its disposal act incrementally as they build upon a history of work
and relevant epistemic communities. As the crisis has subsided, efforts to
coordinate beyond the exigency have tended to face greater political hurdles."'
Therefore, while the G20 continues to administer a host of networks as they
18

See Did the G20 Lose Its Seoul? (Seeking Alpha Nov 21, 2010), online at
(visited Oct 16, 2011)
http://seekingalpha.com/article/237890-did-the-g20-lose-its-seoul
(highlighting the role of the G20 at the Seoul Summit and its endorsement of Basel III and
restructuring of IMF). See also The Basel iii Accord: The New Basel iii Framework, online at
http://www.basel-iii-accord.com/ (visited Oct 16, 2011) (noting that the G20 leaders officially
endorsed the Basel III framework at the November 2010 Seoul Summit); John Lipsky, The PostSummit Prospectsfor Poliy Cooperation:An Address to the Economic Club of New York (Nov 23, 2010),
online at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2010/112310.htm (visited Oct 16, 2011)
(discussing how the G20 Leaders affirmed the importance of MAP at the Seoul Summit).

159

See Roya Wolverson, G20's Tepid Economic Reform (Council on Foreign Rel Oct 25, 2010), online at
(visited Oct 16, 2011)
http://www.cfr.org/economics/g20s-tepid-economic-reform/p23218
("The G20 finance meeting this weekend in Gyeongju, South Korea, failed to produce concrete
measures to tame worsening trade and currency imbalances ......"); Paul Krugman, The Third
Depression, NY Times A19 (une 27, 2010) ("Around the world-most recently at last weekend's
deeply discouraging G-20 meeting-governments are obsessing about inflation when the real
threat is deflation, preaching the need for belt-tightening when the real problem is inadequate
spending."); Simon Johnson, Capital Failure (NY Times Economix Blog Nov 11, 2010), online at
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/1I/capital-failure/?scp=1&sq=g20/*20failure&st
=cse (visited Oct 16, 2011) ("The Group of 20 has completely failed to do what is necessary to
rein in global megabanks-and to make them safer."); Anat Admati, et al, Letter, Healthy Banking
System is the Goal, Not Profitable Banks (Fin Times Nov 9, 2010), online at
http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/research/admatiFTletter 11.09.10.pdf (visited Oct 16, 2011)
("Basel III bank regulation proposals that Group of 20 leaders will discuss fail to eliminate key
structural flaws in the current system."); SteglitZ CriticizesMultible Shortcomings of the G20 Agenda (Intl
Fin
Insts
in
Latin
Am
Monitor
Sept
29,
2009),
online
at
http://ifis.choike.org/informes/l111.html (visited Oct 16, 2011) ("The fact that the G20
allocated its funds almost entirely to the IMF means in part that the world does not yet have the
right kind of institutions for effective crisis response."); Anders Aslund, The Group of 20 Must Be
Stopped (Fin Times Nov 26, 2009), online at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/37deaeb4-dad0-llde933d-00144feabdcO.html#ixzzlPU5zsLUi (visited Oct 16, 2011) ("[T]he G20 actually violates
fundamental principles of international co-operation by arrogating for itself important financial
decisions that should be shared by all countries. In so doing it also emasculates the sovereign
rights of small countries that have long been the prime defenders of multilateralism and
international law as well as the foremost policy innovators."); Hans Dembowski, Criticism of G20
Crisis
Management
(2009/02
D+C
51
Feb
2009),
online
at
http://www.inwent.org/ez/articles/087261/index.en.shtml (visited Oct 16, 2011) ("Robert
Zoellick, the president of the World Bank, bemoaned that, instead of safeguarding free trade as
promised in November, some G20 members had taken protectionist steps.").
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develop norms, which often gel into legal standards, the kind of political impetus
characterizing the G20's initial success appears to be waning. As long as the G20
remains a political, and indeed diplomatic, entity as an "Executive Coordinator"
the G20 might have to live with the
amongst different networks,'
disappointment resulting from a mismatch between professionalism and politics.
B. Networks at Play
The G20's coordinated response to the global financial crisis provides a
rich opportunity to analyze sophisticated network dynamics. Like-minded
regulators from different governments in sector-specific TRNs display these
dynamics while working towards goals set by the G20. At the same time, since
any TRN may contain more than one sub-network, such as the BCBS subnetwork of the banking network, the G20's coordination efforts within each
network are vital. As discussed above, the evolution of the G20 into a premier
international economic forum tracks the increasing manifestation of its
coordination efforts to guide, facilitate, and even balance these intra-network
dynamics. The following subsections examine four principal networks at play in
the G20: (1) the banking network, (2) the securities network, (3) the insurance
network, and (4) the trade network.
1. The banking network.
The most prominent TRN that the G20's Leaders Summit coordinates is
the banking network. The G20 mobilized the pre-existing banking networks at
the FSB, the IMF, and the BCBS. The G20 linked them all together to build a
larger, more capable TRN. It then directed the network's activities during the
financial crisis of 2008.
The G20 finance ministers and central bank governors formally established
the banking network in 1999 at its ministerial. While the ministerial involves
finance ministers and central bank governors, lower level officials meet prior to
the ministerial to begin negotiations and to work on logistics and technical
matters."' Much work goes on prior to ministerial meetings, including "two
deputies meetings each year as well as extensive technical work, including an
array of workshops, reports and case studies on specific subjects." 6 2 There are
also meetings amongst "sherpas," who are the personal representatives of the

Claire R. Kelly, Financial Crises and Civil Sodety, 11 Chi J Intl L 505, 515 (2011). See also
Alexandroff and Kirton, The "GreatRecession" at 193 (cited in note 102) (referring to the group as
an "implicit global executive committee").
161 Nelson, The G-20 and InternationalEconomic Cooperaionat *7 (cited in note 95).
160

162

Id.
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ministers and meet both prior to and following the summits to attend to the
details of the proposals and conclusions reached at the summits.
The FSB, while part of the banking network, could be considered a core
coordinator amongst various financial networks within the G20, including the
securities and insurance networks. This is especially true of its role within the
banking network. During the 2008 crisis, the G20 instructed the FSB to take
charge of coordinating exit strategies from bailout plans' and surveillance of
the exit strategies.164 The banking network also encompasses the World Bank16 1
and the IMF, as both institutions utilize the networks of national finance
ministers and central bankers.' 66 The World Bank funds various projects in
developing countries, such as "education, health, public administration,
infrastructure, financial and private sector development, agriculture and

163

164

Michael Crowley, G-20 Background Note, *4 (The Pew Econ Poly Dept 2009), online at
http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/policy%20page/G-20-Note-Final.pdf (visited Oct 16, 2011).
London and Washington Progress Report, TT 35-38 (cited in note 136). The membership of the FSB is
all G20 countries, the former FSF members, Spain, and the European Commission. The FSF
preceded the FSB and was itself preceded by the Joint Forum on Financial Conglomerates.
Slaughter, A New World Orderat 135 (cited in note 2). The actual members are the central bank
governors and finance ministers from Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France,
Germany, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Republic of
Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, and US.
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165
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Links
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online

at

http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/fsbmembers.htm (visited Oct 16, 2011). Also, the
following organizations take part in the operation of the FSB: IOSCO, the Basel Committee, the
BIS, the European Central Bank, the European Commission, the IMF, the OECD, the World
Bank, the Committee on the Global Financial System, the Committee on Payment and Settlement
Systems, the IAIS, and the IASB.
The World Bank consists of five institutions: The International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), the International
Finance Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). For a complete description
of these five institutions, see Paul McClure, ed, A Guide to the World Bank 10-23 (World Bank
2003). The World Bank provides loans to developing countries to foster economic and social
development. Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, Art I, 5 (i), 60 Stat 1440, 2 Treaty Ser No 134 (1944), amended 16 UST 1942, 606
Treaty Ser No 294; Articles of Agreement of the International Development Association,
Preamble, 11 UST 2284, 439 Treaty Set No 249 (1960). See The World Bank, Articles ofAgreement,
at
online
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/BO
DEXT/0,,contentMDK:50004943-menuPK:64020045-pagePK:64020054-piPK:64020408-the
SitePK:278036,00.html (visited Oct 16, 2011). Member countries fund it through the purchase of
capital stock.
Anne Marie Slaughter points out that the World Bank's and IMF's weighted voting mechanisms
elevate them somewhat as distinct entities rather than merely forums for a network. Slaughter, A
New World Orderat 22-23 (cited in note 2).
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environmental and natural resource management.""' It also enforces certain
principles and standards by conditioning the provision of those resources on the
implementation of those principles and standards. 1
The IMF carries out the G20's action plans in the area of banking
regulation mainly due to its expertise. The IMF facilitates global monetary
cooperation using three tools: 9 economic surveillance, technical assistance, and
lending.o First, the IMF monitors the economic health of member countries,
alerting them to potential risks. Through its system of "bilateral surveillance,""'
it annually evaluates all 186 of its member countries and then discusses with
each country "whether there are risks to the economy's domestic and external
stability that would argue for adjustments in economic or financial policies."172 It
may also engage in multilateral consultations involving global stability issues. 7 1
Its technical assistance focuses on a variety of topics, including "fiscal policy,
monetary and exchange rate policies, banking and financial system supervision
and regulation, and statistics."l 7 4 It also lends to countries in financial crisis. For
example, the IMF recently loaned the Ukraine sixteen billion dollars to aid its

167

The

168

See Stzglitq CriiiiesMulfile Shortcomings (cited in note 159).

169

See IMF, Our Work, online at http://www.imf.org/external/about/ourwork.htm (visited Oct 16,
2011).
Carlo Gola and Francesco Spadafora, FinancialSector Surveillance and the IMF *3 (Working Paper
No 247 2009), online at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp09247.pdf (visited
Oct 16, 2011).
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http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,pagePK:50004410-piP
K:36602-theSitePK:29708,00.html (visited Oct 16, 2011).

Id. See also IMF, The 2007 Surveillance Decision: Retised Operational Guidance *9 (2009), online at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/062209.pdf (visited Oct 16, 2011).
IMF, How We Do It, online at http://www.imf.org/external/about/howwedo.htm (visited Oct 16,
2011).
David Robinson, IMF-Backed Plan to Cut Global Imbalances (IMF Aug 7, 2007), online at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2007/SurveyartA.htm (visited Oct 16, 2011).
IMF, How We Do It (cited in note 172).
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banking industry.'7 1 It has also coordinated with the FSB to explore gaps in data
collection at the direction of the G20. 71
Another crucial pillar of the banking network is the BCBS, comprised of
the central bank governors from twenty-seven countries. 177 Housed in the BIS,
the BCBS "generates global public goods of information and expertise""' in the
area of banking supervision. It drafts a variety of technical regulatory prototypes
relating to capital adequacy and liquidity requirements of banks."' These
regulatory prototypes, while non-binding in a formal legal sense, are highly
respected due to the BCBS's professional legitimacy. The G20 has invoked the
BCBS's competence and reputation and assigned it several roles in its action

plans. 18
The G20 has orchestrated these components of the banking network to
produce both frameworks and more definite regulatory prototypes in its
characteristically incremental manner. For example, in implementing the
Frameworkfor Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth, the G20 first tasked the IMF
and the World Bank with a reporting function in the Finance Ministers' Meeting

175

IMF to Loan Ukraine Billions to Cope with GlobalCrisis (Radio Free Eur Radio Liberty Oct 27, 2008),
at
online
http://www.rferl.org/Content/IMFToLoanUkraineBillionsToCopeWithGlobal
-Crisis/1335307.html (visited Oct 16, 2011); IMF, IMF Completes Second Review under Stand-By
Arrangement with Ukraine and Approves US $3.3 Billion Disbursement, Press Release No 09/271 (July
28, 2009), online at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2009/pr09271.htm (visited Oct 16,
2011).
176
See FSB, The FinancialCrisisand Information Gaps: Report to the G-20 Finance Ministers and CentralBank
Governors *4 (2009), online at http://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/102909.pdf (visited Oct
16, 2011).
177 Stefan Walter, Basel II and Revisions to the Captial Requirements Directive: Remarks to the European
Pariament Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on the BCBS's Reform Program (May 3, 2010),
online at http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100503.htn (visited Oct 16, 2011) (discussing the
impact, calibration, and implementation of the BCBS).
17s Michael S. Barr and Geoffrey P. Miller, GlobalAdministrativeLaw: The View from Basel 17 Eur J Intl
179

180

L 15, 22 (2006).
See BIS, About the Basel Committee (cited in note 25) (noting that the BCBS develops guidelines and
supervisory standards for banks, including standards on capital adequacy).
See G20, Washington Declaration,Action Plan at 3 (cited in note 107) (discussing that the BCBS
"should study the need for and help develop firms' new stress testing models, as appropriate").
See also G20, Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System-London *4 (2009), online at
http://www.g20.org/Documents/FinDepsFinRegAnnex020409_- 1615_final.pdf (visited
Oct 16, 2011) (discussing the role of the BCBS in compensation and its position to strengthen
international cooperation and international frameworks for prudential regulation); The Pittsbugh
Summit, 1 13 (cited in note 106) (highlighting a way to strengthen the international financial
regulatory system by building high quality capital and mitigating pro-cyclicality).
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at St. Andrews, Scotland, in November 2009."' The Framework specified that
the IMF must analyze how countries' "respective national or regional policy
frameworks fit together." 18 2 The World Bank had been asked to report on
development and poverty reduction.'13 The Framework also initiated a new
"mutual assessment" process and constructed a detailed timetable for its
operation."s4 Subsequently, at the Leaders Meeting in Toronto, Canada, in June
of 2010, the G20 reviewed the policy proposal prepared by the IMF and moved
forward on a consultative mutual assessment process. As part of this process,
they developed a basket of policy options "to achieve stronger, more sustainable
and more balanced growth." 85
Of course, the G20's executive coordination reaches beyond the blueprint
level: it also generates more concrete regulatory prototypes, such as the Basel III
Accord. The development of Basel III eloquently demonstrates how the G20
coordinated the banking network to produce a regulatory prototype. The G20
Summit in Washington, DC, in November 2008, issued the "Washington Action
Plan." In the Plan, G20 leaders instructed the IMF and the expanded FSF to
develop "recommendations," which would eventually evolve into a new
regulatory prototype on bank capital.' Upon receiving this instruction, the FSF
and its members immediately focused on the bank capital adequacy ratio. The
G20 Leaders also agreed that the BCBS would provide new guidelines for
harmonized capital requirements by the end of 2009.117
The Basel regulatory prototypes aim to use "capital adequacy"
requirements to minimize systemic banking risks.' Every bank takes on a risk
when it makes a loan or other financial instrument that the bank will lose
money: for example, the borrower may not repay the loan ("settlement risk") or
the asset may decrease in value, for example, because of changes in interest rates
("market risk").'"9 Because banks and other financial institutions engage in so
181 G20, Communiqui: Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, T 3 (2010), online at

http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/g20finance100423.html

(visited Oct 16, 2011). The G20

Pittsburgh summit also committed to reduce fossil fuel energy subsidies. See The Pittsburgh Summit,
29 (cited in note 106).
182 The PittsburghSummit, 1 5 (cited in note 106).
183 Id.
184 Id at T 6-7.
185 Toronto Summit Declaration,18 (cited in note 106).

186 G20, Progress Report on the Actions of the Washington Acton Plan,

8 (2009), online at

http://www.g20.org/Documents/FINALAnnexonActionPlan.pdf (visited Oct 16, 2011).
187 Id at

13.

188 See Hal S. Scott, InternationalFinance: Transactions, Pofcy, and Regulations 414-73 (Foundation 17th

ed 2010) (discussing capital adequacy regulation in the Basel Accords).
189 Id at 461-62 (discussing banks' risks associated with their securities operations).
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many transactions with each other, insolvency at one bank may cause such bank
to default on loans it owes to other banks, creating a domino effect of
insolvencies. The risk that one bank's financial troubles will spread to other
banks is "systemic" risk.190 Capital adequacy requirements try to mitigate
systemic risk by requiring banks to keep a percentage of their outstanding loans
and other assets available, so that if a settlement or market risk is realized, the
bank stays solvent and does not default on obligations to other institutions.
"Risk-weighting" requires banks to keep in their reserves a larger percentage of
the value of loans that have higher settlement or market risks than they are
required to keep for lower-risk loans."' To understand the role of capital
adequacy standards one must remember that when a highly leveraged firm
suffers a loss, creditors tend to withdraw funding, which might require the firm
to sell off assets, which may precipitate further losses.' 92 If other firms are
counterparties or hold similar assets, systemic risk increases and capital dries up.
Regulators who prefer greater capital requirements see these capital
requirements as buffers against those losses that might precipitate a crisis.
Admittedly, the BCBS's role in capital adequacy started long before the
2008 crisis. Prior to the 2008 crisis the BCBS developed Basel I and Basel II.
Both Basel I and Basel II provided capital buffers, yet failed to prevent the 2008
crisis."' Some have suggested that the failure of Basel I and Basel II can be
traced to the fact that in each, the needed buffer was tied to an individual firm
and not to the systemic relationship amongst firms.19 4 Moreover, a buffer, which
some critics would suggest only provides a second-best solution, might be either
too costly or ineffective.' The best solution, they would argue, is to force banks
190

Id at 461 (defining "systemic risk").

191 Id at 423.
192

Viral V. Acharya, Nirupama Kulkarni, and Matthew Richardson, Capital, Contingent Capital and
Liquidity Requirements in Viral V. Acharya, et al, eds, Regulating Wall Street: The Dodd-Frank Act and
the New Architecture of GlobalFinance 143, 143-45 (Wiley 2011).

193

Id at 143-44.

194

Id at 145-46.

195

WSBI-ESBC, Position Regarding the Basel Consultationon a "CountergeicalCapital Buffer Proposal"**6-7
http://www.wsbi.org/uploadedFiles/Position-papers/0992-WSBIonline
at
(2010),
ESBG%20Position%20tegarding/o2the%2Basel%20consultation%200n%20a%20%E2%80%9
CCountercycical%20buffer%20proposalE2%80%9D%20_BCBS%20172_.pdf (visited Oct 16,
2011) ("An inappropriate level of regulatory requirements (i.e., too low or too high capital
buffers) might prove to be either inefficient or excessively expensive. Because capital is costly and
because investors in times of crisis are looking for secure investments, we believe that there is a
risk that the proposed buffers would turn into a set of new minimum requirements thereby
missing the initial objective."); Building Societies Assn, Our Response to Two Basel Committee
Consultations: Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking Sector (CP 164) and International
Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring (CP165) *5 (2010), online
at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl65/tbsa.pdf (visited Oct 16, 2011) ("Another unintended
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to internalize the cost of systemic risk." 6 Basel III, arguably, merely tinkers with
the model established in Basel I and Basel II. It does not force banks to
internalize the cost of risk, and indeed some critics would contend that Basel III
encourages firms to avoid its strictures by seeking a shadow-banking regime,
which tends to create systemic risk.' 9 Thus, at first glance Basel III appears to
be one of the failings of intra-network dynamics. The process of crafting capital
adequacy regulation can be insular and limiting. The virtue of empathetic
sympathization-that is, that it brings network actors together-also may stop
these same actors from taking a step back to see the failures of their actions. If
one starts with a failed product, then the outgrowth of future intra-network
dynamics will arguably be more failure. Thus, the network dynamics involved in
Basel III might lead to more, not less, failure (if one views Basel I and Basel II as
flawed products).
Apart from the controversial merits, or demerits, of Basel III, it is still
worth examining the developments leading to Basel III to evaluate fully the
G20's coordination efforts as well as the intra-network dynamism. The BCBS's
goal for Basel III was to hedge better against systemic losses by providing for
greater capital requirements, enhanced liquidity, and countercyclical buffers."'
Still, disagreements arose over what types of investment qualified as "capital"
and what percentage of assets needed to be held as capital.'" The G20 prodded
the BCBS along through coordinating the work of the BCBS and other entities
such as the FSB, the IMF, and IOSCO, using a combination of action plans

196

consequence of too costly liquidity requirements will be to push banks into higher risk business to
compensate for holding low margin, or unprofitable assets, clearly not the intention of the
proposed rules.'; Building Societies Assn, Independent Commission on Banking: Callfor Etidence *2
http://bankingcommission.independent.gov.uk/wponline
at
(2010),
content/uploads/2011/01/Building-Society-Association-Issues-Paper-Response.pdf (visited Oct
16, 2011) ("Overall, the Commission must decide what it is trying to optimise, or whether some
sort of second best solution, for example relying on capital buffers, is sufficient.").
Acharya, Kulkarni, and Richardson, Liquidity Requirements at 151 (cited in note 192).

197

Id at 144.

198

BCBS, Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilent Banks and Banking Systems, **2-7
(2010), online at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl89.pdf (visited Oct 16, 2011) (discussing erosion
of quality of capital which led to the 2007 financial crisis and listing Basel Committee's goals for
Basel III).
(visited Oct 16, 2011)
("[Ifhe industry argues that the committee is going overboard in many areas and doing so in ways
that will significantly, and unnecessarily, raise the cost of providing loans and other banking
services. ... Banks in every country gain considerable benefit from at least one of the balance
sheet items that will no longer count as capital and therefore put forth arguments as to why they
should continue to count.").

199 IFAM Group, Basel III, online at http://www.ifamgroup.com/basel-iii/
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followed by progress reports. 200 By the Pittsburgh Summit in September 2009,
the G20 members agreed on an initial definition of "capital," though how that
definition would apply to certain hybrid equities was unresolved. The G20 then
instructed the BCBS to issue concrete proposals to "raise the consistency and
transparency of the Tier 1 capital base" 20 1 and harmonize the definition of
capital across jurisdictions by the end of 2009, conduct an impact assessment at
the beginning of 2010, and complete the task by the end of 2010.202
The making of the new bank capital requirements intensified after the G20
Pittsburgh Summit. By the G20 Toronto Meeting in June, 2010, the BCBS had
undertaken a comprehensive "bottom-up" quantitative impact assessment as
well as a detailed "top-down" macroeconomic impact assessment of the bank
capital requirements.203 Meanwhile, the guidelines for defining "capital" took
more solid shape. These newer regulations provided more detail regarding
different types of bank equity, and they required banks to hold substantially
more equity than had been proposed in the initial guidelines agreed to at
Pittsburgh. In September 2010, the BCBS finally announced its new capital
requirements, Basel III, which established a minimum common equity
requirement of 7 percent as well as an additional counter-cyclical buffer
including up to 2.5 percent of risk-weighted assets. The G20 members endorsed
Basel III at the Seoul Summit in November 2010. Notably, at the same time, the
G20 leaders and the banking network encouraged states to implement Basel
11.204

200 The G20 Leaders prodded the various agencies through a combination of goal setting and
reporting. The Leaders would set goals for particular summits for the various TRNs and would
situate these goals in the context of a larger plan of action. The BCBS goals would be part of an
overall plan for prudential regulation for example. By charting the plan of action and the progress
on each action item, the G20 effectively prodded the TRNs to move forward with their work.
See, for example, London and Washington Progress Report (cited in note 136); Progress Report on the
Washington Action Plan (cited in note 186); G20, Progress Report on the Actions to Promote Financial
at
online
(2009),
Reform
Regulatory
http://www.g20.org/Documents/pittsburgh-progress-report-250909.pdf (visited Oct 16, 2011)
(PittsburghProgress Reporl.
201 PittsburghProgress Report, 10 (cited in note 200).
202

Id.

203

G20, Progress Report on the Economic and FinancialActionsof the London, Washington and Pittsburgh G20
G20,
1 56 (2010), online at
Korea, Chair of the
Summits Prepared by
http://www.g20.org/Documents2010/07/July2010 G20_ProgressGrid.pdf (visited Oct 16,
2011) (Progress Report on the Previous Summits).

201

Letter from Michel Pebereau and Clemens B6rsig, members of European Financial Services
Round Table, to Christine Lagarde, Minister of Finance in France (Feb 16, 2011), online at
http://www.efr.be/documents/news/75.2011.02./20EFR/20Letter/ 20to/20G20%20Finance
%20Minister%20Lagarde%2016.02.2011.pdf (visited Oct 16, 2011) (urging G20 commitment to
implement Basel II and III). See also Seoul Summit Declaration(cited in note 106).
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The process of developing Basel III required several points of positionshifting and reconciliation where we could expect to see intra-network dynamics
at work. First, reports indicate that German and French officials had concerns
that the Basel III standards would be too stringent and require implementation
too quickly.205 One proposal attributed to the US and the UK was to
compromise on the scope of the standards by tinkering with the definition of
"ccapital," specifically to exclude minority interests of financial institutions held
by banks.206 Indeed, some saw the willingness of the US and UK to be
persuaded as evidence of their belief in the global approach and the legitimacy
that had been invested in it.2 07 Further, while the Basel III timetable has been
criticized as too long, some have pointed to the need to compromise on this
issue due to the state of the recovery in some countries as well as the need for
some (particularly European) banks to restructure, given the new capital
definitions.2 08 Some issues, such as whether and how to recognize new capital
instrumentS209 and the establishment of buffers210 remained unresolved. These
unresolved issues represent a limit of the G20's coordination, at least at this
moment.211
At the same time, the incremental formation of Basel III also offers an
excellent avenue for locating the intra-network dynamics leading up to this
regulatory prototype created by the banking network. First of all, the network
collaboration in this highly professional area would not be possible without the
widely shared, if not uniform, professional backgrounds among network
participants. Government officials from different countries' finance ministries
and central banks spoke a similar, if not identical, language, similar enough to
communicate with each other. They understand what the terms "Tier I capital"
and "risk capture" mean. This expert sympathization among network
participants expands any otherwise local regulatory dialogue into a multilateral
horizon so that like-minded regulators can collaborate on the eventual
formulation of a regulatory product, such as Basel III.
205

Yalman Onaran and Simon Clark, European Banks Poisedto Win Reprieve on CapitalRules (Bloomberg
July 12, 2010), online at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-05-16/geithner-meetingbarnier-over-basel-iii-creates-pressure-on-banks-capital.htmI (visited Oct 16, 2011).

206

Id.

207

Id.

208

Charles Freeland, Basel III Standardsfor Banks' Capitaland Liquidity Is on Track (G+ Oct 9, 2010),
online at http://www.glgroup.com/News/Basel-III-standards-for-banks-capital-and-liquidity-ison-track-50915.htmi (visited Oct 16, 2011).
Id. See also BCBS, Proposal to Ensure the Loss Absorbeng of Regulatoy Capital at the Point of NonViabibty 1 (2010), online at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl74.pdf (visited Oct 16, 2011).

209

210

See Freeland, Base/III Standardsfor Banks' Capitaland Liquidily Is on Track (cited in note 208).

211

See note 159.
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Admittedly, not every dialogue leads to consensus or convergence. There
may be disagreements on a number of issues at a professional level. To narrow
the gap of these disagreements among them, some participants attempt to
"persuade" other members to accept their positions. When this attempt to
persuade occurs simultaneously from both directions, two parties engage in a
"negotiation." In the banking network, Franco-German regulators persuaded
their US and UK counterparts to exclude minority interests of financial
institutions held by banks from the definition of "capital." In return, the US and
UK regulators were able to persuade their European counterparts to accept
Basel III despite the latter's concern about implementation due to the new
capital definition.212
Unsurprisingly, developing countries played a relatively small role, if any, in
the establishment of Basel III, mainly due to their limited influence in this area.
Nonetheless, they decided to remain engaged in order to preserve their position
in the network. This is a good example of willing marginalization. Finally, most
participants engaged in deliberation on Basel III despite the fact that they could
not resolve all the issues on the table. Some issues remain unresolved.
Nonetheless, network participants understood the incremental nature of this
network operation and were able to hammer out a modest yet still desirable
outcome. The G20 network process that created Basel III typifies "responsive
engagement" in that it signifies that the network participants are still willing to
negotiate, at least on some issues, even if they may fail to reach agreement on
others at this time. Such responsive engagement is vital in preserving
momentum in regulatory dialogue regardless of any immediate regulatory end
product. In sum, the banking network participants' understanding of responsive
engagement enabled the network operation to move forward. Possibly, these
same participants may produce Basel IV or V later on as their networking
continues.
The G20 Leaders' role in the process was to set specific targets (that is,
harmonization of definitions), and objectives (guidelines) and deadlines. It then
situated these goals in the context of a larger plan of action and reported on the
progress. This strategy of setting specific tasks for the TRNs and then reporting
on the process facilitated the incremental work of the network dynamics.
In sum, to deliver a new regulatory prototype, such as Basel III, the G20
choreographed various component networks, such as the IMF and the BCBS, in
such a way that the TRNs could be geared toward a collective goal. Here, the
G20, as an executive coordinator, was able to mobilize its unique political capital
212

See Elena Logutenkova and Fabio Benedetti-Valentini, BNP Grows to Biggest Bank As France Says
Site Doesn't Matter (Bloomberg Nov 4, 2010), online at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201011-03/bnp-grows-to-biggest-bank-as-france-says-size-doesn-t-matter.html (visited Oct 16, 2011).
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in orchestrating these components, generate various regulatory prototypes, and
eventually confirm them. At the same time, however, due to the largely insular
nature of intra-network dynamics, the banking network operation may still be
insular and unresponsive to external debates or criticisms on the merits of its
regulatory products such as Basel III.
2. The securities network.
The G20 makes use of IOSCO, a broad and active network of national
securities regulators.213 IOSCO develops and promotes "consistent standards of
regulation, oversight and enforcement in order to protect investors, maintain
fair, efficient and transparent markets, and seek to address systemic risks." 2 14 It
operates through several committees, the most important of which is the
Technical Committee.215
Over the years IOSCO has developed a number of important standards
and best practices: accounting standards,216 core standards to facilitate crossborder offerings and listings,2 17 global investment performance standards,21

213

214

See IOSCO, online at http://www.iosco.org (visited Oct 16, 2011). Currently IOSCO has 201
members: 115 ordinary members, 11 associate members, and 75 affiliate members. IOSCO:
Membership and Committees List, online at http://www.iosco.org/lists/ (visited Oct 16, 2011). It has
three categories of membership: ordinary, associate, and affiliate. See id. Ordinary membership is
open to primary national securities regulators. About IOSCO: Membershp Categories and Criteria,
online at http://www.iosco.org/about/index.cfm?section=membership (visited Oct 16, 2011). As
ordinary members, national securities regulators each have one vote in the Presidents'
Committee's Annual Conference. Associate members are other securities and or futures
regulators in a jurisdiction. Associate members have no vote and are not eligible for the Executive
Committee; however, they are members of the Presidents' Committee. Id. Affiliate members are
self-regulatory bodies, which are not members of Presidents' Committee, and are without a vote
or eligibility for the Executive Committee. Id.
IOSCO, About IOSCO: GeneralInformation, online at http://www.iosco.org/about (visited Oct 16,
2011).

215

216

217
218

The Technical Committee's work covers multinational disclosure and accounting, regulation of
secondary markets, regulation of market intermediaries, enforcement and the exchange of
information, investment management, and credit rating agencies. IOSCO, About lOSCO: Working
Committees, online at http://www.iosco.org/about/index.cfm?section=workingcmts (visited Oct
16, 2011).
The Technical Comm of the IOSCO, Statement on Accounting Standards Development and Enforcement
(Oct 21, 2008), online at http://www.iasplus.com/iosco/0810techcommittee.pdf (visited Oct 16,
2011).
IOSCO,
IASC
Standards:
Assessment
Report
*4
(2000),
online
at
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD109.pdf (visited Oct 16, 2011).
Emerging Markets Comm of the IOSCO, Performance Presentation Standardsfor Collective Investment
Schemes *2 (Dec 2000), online at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD114.pdf
(visited Oct 16, 2011).
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auditing standards, 219 disclosure standards to facilitate cross-border offerings and
listings by multinational issuers,220 and international standards for central
counterparty clearing organizations. 2 21 These standards and best practices are
widely adopted by the leading financial regulators and are, as a result, followed
by transnational firms. 222
IOSCO's engagement with the G20's crisis management began when
IOSCO sent an open letter to the G20, applauding its efforts to deal with the
crisis and offering assistance.223 Its Technical Committee created a task force to
support the G20's efforts.224 It undertook a number of tasks in connection with
the G20's efforts, including its collaboration with the BCBS and the IAIS as part
of a Joint Forum that resulted in the report on the DefferentiatedNature and Scope of
FinancialRegulation.225
219

JOSCO,

Statement on International Auditing Standards (Nov 9,
2007),
http://www.iasplus.com/iosco/071lisastatement.pdf (visited Oct 16, 2011).

online

at

IOSCO, A Resolution of the Presidents' Committee on IOSCO Endorsement of Disclosure Standards to
isdtings by Multinational Issuers (1998), online at
Facilitate Cross-Border Offerings and
http://www.iosco.org/library/resolutions/pdf/IOSCORES17.pdf (visited Oct 16, 2011).
221 IOSCO,
Recommendations
for
Central
Counterparties
*2
(2004),
online
at
http://www.iosco.org/1ibrary/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD176.pdf (visited Oct 16,2011).
220

222

IOSCO, IOSCO PubHhes Regulatory Standardsfor Funds of Hedge Funds (Sept 14, 2009) online at
http://www.iosco.org/news/pdf/IOSCONEWS166.pdf (visited Oct 16, 2011).

223

Jane Diplock, Christopher Cox, and Guillermo Larrain, Open Letter to the G20 (Nov 12, 2008),
online at http://www.iosco.org/1ibrary/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD282.pdf (visited Oct 16, 2011).
IOSCO, IOSCO Technical Committee Launches Task Force to Support G-20 Aims (Nov 25, 2008),
online at www.iosco.org/news/pdf/IOSCONEWS134.pdf (visited Oct 16, 2011).

224
225

See Joint Forum, Review of the Diferendated Nature and Scope of Financial Regulation: Key Issues and
at
online
2010),
(Jan
*4
Recommendations
http://www.iaisweb.org/-temp/Review-of_theDifferentiatedNatureandScopeofFinanci
al_Regulation.January.2010.pdf (visited Oct 16, 2011) (containing core principles as well as
cross-sectoral standards to avoid systemic risk and regulatory arbitrage); Progress Report on the
Previous Summits, 63 (cited in note 203). The report focused on underwriting standards as well as
hedge fund activities. Each of the networks involved, including IOSCO, were tasked with
developing principles to respond to regulatory deficits while the FSB oversaw policy
implementation. IOSCO, for example, in June 2010 issued its "revised Objectives and Principles
of Securities Regulation to incorporate eight new principles." Id at 66. The resulting report
illustrates the long-standing collaboration of IOSCO with Basel Committee as well as the IAIS
over many years. The report relied on numerous prior reports and studies, including Joint Forum,
Supervision ofFinancial Conglomerates (Feb 1999), online at www.bis.org/publ/bcbs47.pdf (visited
Oct 18, 2011); Joint Forum, Core Principles: Cross-Sectoral Comparison (Nov 2001), online at
www.bis.org/publ/joint03.pdf (visited Oct 18, 2011); Joint Forum, Risk Management Practices and
Regulatog Capital Cross-Sectoral Comparison (Nov 2001), online at www.bis.org/publ/joint04.pdf
(visited Oct 18, 2011); Joint Forum, Credit Risk Transfer (Mar 2005), online at
www.bis.org/publ/jointl3.pdf (visited Oct 18,2011); Joint Forum, Regulatoy and Market Differences:
Issues and Observations (May 2006), online at www.bis.org/publ/jointl5.pdf; Joint Forum, Customer
Suitability in the Retail Sale of Financial Products and Services (Apr 2008), online at
www.bis.org/publ/joint2O.pdf (visited Oct 18, 2011); Joint Forum, Credit Risk Transfer:
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Most illustrative for our purposes though is IOSCO's engagement in the
regulation of CRAs, both before and during the 2008 financial crisis, which
reveals the use of intra-network dynamics over a period of time.
IOSCO's focus on CRAs emerged after the East Asian financial crisis and
again after the failures of WorldCom and Enron in 2002. CRAs issue ratings that
indicate only "the likelihood that a particular debt security will perform
according to its terms."226 While a high credit rating never meant that something
was a good investment, the extent to which regulators, such as the SEC or the
Banking Network in Basel II, referenced credit ratings infused them with
credibility. 227 As is widely known now, this veneer of credibility created problems
because there were real gaps in CRAs' regulation long before the most recent
CriSiS.228
The IOSCO Technical Committee targeted the CRA gap starting in 2003
with a Report of the Activiies of Credit Rating Agencies. 229 IOSCO also published a
set of Principles Regarding the Activities of CRAs in 2003.230 But critics
questioned the sufficiency of these principles to address CRA problems
stemming from Basel II's use of the ratings.2 3 1 IOSCO responded with a Code of
Conduct Fundamentalsfor CRAs, offering greater specificity with respect to such
issues as conflicts of interest, independence, and transparency. 232 Interestingly,
the rating agencies themselves got into the act, developing their own Code of
Professional Conduct in the second half of 2005. Indeed, IOSCO's March 2009
Developmentsfrom 2005 to 2007 (July 2008), online at www.bis.org/publ/joint2l.pdf (visited Oct 18,
2011); Joint Forum, Stocktaking on the Use of Credit Ratings (June 2009), online at
www.bis.org/publ/joint22.pdf (visited Oct 18, 2011); and Joint Forum, Report on Special Purposes
Entities (Sept 2009), online at www.bis.org/publ/joint23.pdf (visited Oct 18, 2011). The
conclusions and recommendations are based upon this prior work of each of the networks
working independently as well as the three working together through the Joint Forum.
226 Karmel and Kelly, 34 Brooklyn J Intl L at 924-25 (cited in note 85). See also Standard & Poor's,
at
online
(2010),
**3-4
Essentials
Rating
Credit
to
Guide
http://www.asifma.org/pdf/SPCreditRatingsGuide.pdf (visited Oct 18, 2011).
227 Karmel and Kelly, 34 Brooklyn J Intl L at 925 (cited in note 85).
228

See, for example, id at 925 ("The failure of the CRAs to promptly adjust ratings or forecast the
demise of issuers that went bankrupt when the stock market technology bubble burst then led to
scrutiny of their performance and the lack of government regulation.").

229

The Technical Comm of the IOSCO, Report on the Activiies of Credit Rating Agencies **1-2 (2003),
online at http://www.fsa.go.jp/inter/ios/20030930/05.pdf (visited Oct 16, 2011).

230

The Technical Comm of the IOSCO, IOSCO Statement of Prinales Regarding the Activities of Credit
RatingAgencies (2003), online at http://www.fsa.go.jp/inter/ios/20030930/02.pdf (visited Oct 16,
2011).

231

Karmel and Kelly, 34 Brooklyn J Intl L at 927 (cited in note 85).

232

The Technical Comm of the IOSCO, Code of Conduct Fundamentalsfor Credit Rating Agencies **3-4
at
online
2008),
May
revised
(2004,
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD180.pdf (visited Oct 16, 2011).
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Report Assessing CRAs found that many of them had adopted codes of conduct
233
that reflected IOSCO's Code of Conduct Fundamentals.
In 2006, prior to the most recent crisis, the US Congress addressed
perceived deficiencies in the CRA system. Following the IOSCO's Code of
Conduct for CRAs, Congress passed the Credit Agency Reform Act of 2006
"which established a system of registration and regulation of [CRAs] and
instructed the SEC to formulate implementing rules." 23 4 IOSCO's principles
"focused on the quality of the ratings process, including updating of opinions,
conflicts of interest, employee and analyst independence, and transparency." 2 35
The 2006 CRA Reform Act implemented these principles by, among other
things, establishing a system of non-mandatory registration and imposing
substantive requirements with respect to conflicts of interest, public
information, and anticompetitive practices.2 36 The Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC) passed implementing rules. Among other things, the rules
"prohibit credit raters from rating their own work, and ban employees who help
determine a credit rating from negotiating any fees." 237
Although IOSCO's CRA prototype had become hard law in the US,
IOSCO continued elaborating its standards. It updated its Code of Conduct and
issued a Consultation Report.238 But critics persisted. In 2008, EU Commissioner
Charles McCreevy called IOSCO's efforts toothless.2 39 The EU pushed for and
developed stricter standards for the regulation of CRAs, the strictest of any

233
234

235
236

237

238

239

Progress Report on the PreiousSummits, 93 (cited in note 203).
Karmel and Kelly, 34 Brooklyn J Intl L at 927 (cited in note 85). See also Credit Rating Agency
Reform Act of 2006, 15 USC 5 78o-7 (2006 & Supp 2010).
Karmel and Kelly, 34 Brooklyn J Intl L at 927 (cited in note 85).
Global Legal Information Network, Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, online at
http://www.glin.gov/view.action?glinlD=190699 (visited Oct 16, 2011) (summarizing the Act,
including registration system and requirements).
EU Lawmakers Back Strict Rules on Credit Agencies (EurActiv Mar 25, 2009), online at
http://www.euractiv.com/en/financial-services/eu-lawmakers-back-strict-rules-creditagencies/article- 180606 (visited Oct 16, 2011).
See The Technical Comm of the IOSCO, Final Report: The Role of Credit RatingAgencies in Structured
at
online
(2008),
A
Annex
Markets,
Finance
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD270.pdf (visited Oct 16, 2011).
Gillian Tett, Unease as Regulators Callfor More Control Over Ratings System (Fin Times June 25, 2008),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/cee5928-424e-1 ldd-a5e8online
at
0000779fd2ac.html#axzzlRMNi2Bxi (visited Oct 16, 2011). It has been suggested that the EU
wanted to break the dominance of the US credit rating agencies. Jim Brunsden, Commission Plans to
Get Tough With Rating Agendes (EuropeanVoicecom
June 3, 2010), online at
http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2010/06/commission-plans-to-get-tough-with-ratingagencies/68104.aspx (visited Sept 23, 2011).
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jurisdiction.2 4 The EU Parliament initially put the Committee of European
Securities Regulators (CESR) at the center of a CRA registration system that
included monitoring and implementation. The substantive provisions called for a
review of business models and a decrease in the use of ratings by regulators.24 1
The US balked at the extraterritorial application of the EU regulations.242
Once the 2008 crisis emerged, the G20 attempted to coordinate regulatory
outcomes. Starting with the very first summit, the G20 called upon national
regulators to improve CRA oversight. Previously, the US had pressed for greater
cooperation, while the EU seemed committed to tougher regulation.243 The G20,
through the FSB, asked the US and EU to resolve significant inconsistencies
among their CRA regulations. 2 " The FSB also urged G20 countries to reduce
the use of ratings as the dominant means of assessing risk. Adhering to the
FSB's call, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
eliminated references to credit ratings in several statutes and the EU is
considering similar measures. 245 As a related matter, the BCBS has also been
asked to address reducing the "use of external ratings in the regulatory capital
framework." 246 Likewise, the FSB collects data on the measures taken by
national authorities to reduce their reliance on ratings and to develop principles
"for use by authorities in reducing their reliance on ratings."247 The FSB
committed itself to harmonizing CRA regulatory standards in this area.248
Throughout the crisis, the G20's coordinated work on CRAs continued. It
reiterated its calls for improved regulatory oversight at the London, Pittsburg,
240

See Reforming the Ratings Agencies: Will the U.S. Follow Europe's Tougher Rules? (Knowledge@Wharton
May 27, 2009), online at http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2242 (visited
Oct 16, 2011).
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The rules further provide the CRAs may not provide advisory services; must disclose the models,
methodologies and key assumptions upon which ratings are based; must differentiate the ratings
of complex products with a specific symbol; must publish an annual transparency report; must
have at least two directors on their boards whose salary does not depend on the ratings agency's
business performance; and must create an internal function to review the quality of their ratings.
Id.
EU Lawmakers Back Strict Rules on CreditAgencies (cited in note 237).
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Kristina St. Charles, Note, Regulating Imperiaksm: The Worldwide Export of European Regulatory
Princioles on Credit Rating Agencies, 19 Minn J Intl L 399, 419-46 (2010) (discussing EU's stricter
CRA regulations and the differences from US regulations).
Progress Report on the Previous Summits, 93-95 (cited in note 203).
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Id. See also Kevin Drawbaugh, Global Regulators Urge Credit Rating Ageny Curbs (Reuters Oct 27,
2010), online at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/28/financial-regulation-credit-ratersidCNN2728165520101028 (visited Oct 16, 2011).
ProgressReport on the Previous Summits, 95 (cited in note 203).
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and Toronto Summits. 249 At the Seoul Summit, the G20 approved Basel III's
recommendation to reduce reliance on CRAs. 25 0 IOSCO responded to this G20
goal with its May 2010 Priniples Regarding Cross-Border Supervisoy Cooperation.25 1
IOSCO has monitored CRAs' adoption of codes of conduct consistent with
IOSCO's Code of Conduct Fundamentalsfor CRAs, finding that more CRAs are
adopting the IOSCO standards."' IOSCO is also monitoring the supervisory
initiative of various jurisdictions in light of IOSCO's CRA Princzibles. 253
Despite the G20's coordination, the network dynamics seem to have had
limited success in moving the key players towards regulatory convergence. CRAs
were originally unregulated. 254 The US started to move toward regulation after
Enron collapsed in 2002, culminating in the 2006 Credit Rating Agency Reform
Act.255 In the EU, CRAs were likewise unregulated at first. In 2008, the EU
decided to take a tough approach to CRA regulation, tougher than the
regulations adopted by either IOSCO or the US. Therefore, one might observe
that even before the onset of the financial crisis, the expert community saw the
necessity of regulating CRAs. However, the resulting mixture of EU, US, and
IOSCO regulatory standards betrays the scarcity of intra-network dynamics, in
particular when compared to the banking network, as well as the difficulty of
executive coordination by the G20.
The problem of conflicts of interests, which plagues the industry, is a case
in point. Serious conflicts arose in the industry because issuers chose and paid
the CRAs they used. A CRA that wanted business would be better off if it
tended to give favorable ratings. Initially, this was not a big problem. As each
CRA had an interest in preserving its professional reputation, it would not be
advantageous for a CRA to risk its reputation when there was a sufficient supply

See id (discussing the G20 and Washington Action Plan).
Nagesh Narayana, G20 Agrees on Reduing Rekance on CRA Ratings (Intl Bus Times Nov 11, 2010),
2
online at http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/80745/ 0101111/basel-3-cra-bis-ratings.htm (visited
Oct 16, 2011).
251 Progress Report on the Previous Summits, 46 (cited in note 203).
249
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Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rang Agendes, 82 Wash U L Q 43, 55-56 (2004) (explaining that the
designation of a CRA by the SEC, through the use of a no action letter, merely meant that the
CRA or Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization was one that was accepted by the
market place as a "recognized rating agency").
15 USC § 78o-7; Hill, 82 Wash U L Q at 56-57 (cited in note 254) (explaining the rules centered
around disclosure and prohibiting the SEC from regulating the substance of the CRA's ratings).
The SEC followed up with rules focusing on record-keeping reports and procedures. Following
some criticism, the SEC amended its rule to address transparency and conflicts of interest issues).
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of potential customers (issuers) in the market.256 Unfortunately, when it came to
mortgage-related structured bonds, there were not as many issuers, and therefore
there was an increased threat of conflicts.257 All regulatory bodies recognize
conflicts of interest as a problem. The expert community has been persuaded by
common experience and understanding that there needs to be some external
force that counteracts this inherent conflict. However, as each jurisdiction is
developing its own course, intra-network dynamics, such as persuasion,
negotiation, responsive engagement, and even strategic cooptation, appear to be
absent for the time being.
For example, the US regulation under the Dodd-Frank Act seems weak
when compared to EU efforts. While the Dodd-Frank Act prohibits CRAs from
considering sales and marketing when arriving at a rating, it does little else to
confront conflicts risks.258 Instead, it calls for a two-year study to determine the
feasibility of having another entity assign ratings to structured finance projects.259
In contrast, the EU approach requires that an issuer not only supply information
to the CRA it chooses so that the CRA can provide the rating, but that the issuer
must also make that information available to all CRAs, allowing other CRAs to
rate it and thus creating competition.260 Another issue affecting conflicts of
interest involves providing consultancy or advisory services to a rated entity or
its affiliate. The EU prohibits the provision of such services.261 As one
commentator notes, this EU provision resembles the requirements of IOSCO's
Code of Conduct.262 Yet the US failed to adopt this type of provision in its 2006
legislation. 263 While the Dodd-Frank legislation did address the issue, it simply
ordered the SEC to study the issue, rather than prohibiting the practice itself.264
Notably, however, the G20 has not given up on the matter. Its July 2010
Progress Report notes that "at the request of the FSB, the EU, US and Japan are
continuing their discussions to resolve any significant inconsistencies or frictions
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Edward I. Altman, et al, Regulation ofRaing Agendes, in Acharya, et al, eds, Regulating Wall Street 443,
448 (cited in note 192).
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St. Charles, 19 Minn J Intl L at 432 (cited in note 243), citing Council Regulation 1060/2009,
Annex I, § B(4) 2009 OJ (L 302) 1, 25.
St. Charles, 19 Minn J Intl L at 432, citing IOSCO, Code of Conduct Fundamentalsfor Credit Rating
Agencies (Revised Code of Conduct) § 2.5 (2004, revised May 2008).
St. Charles, 19 Minn J Intl L at 432, citing Dodd-Frank, 15 USC § 78o-7(c)(2).
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that may arise as a result of differences among their new CRA regulations.2 65 At
Seoul the Leaders approved the Basel III recommendation to reduce reliance on
CRAs, but implementation remains with national jurisdictions.2 66
In sum, the securities network demonstrates the limited success, as
measured in terms of regulatory convergence, of the G20's coordination. While
the G20 did succeed in establishing a regulatory prototype calling for its
members to duly regulate CRAs and minimize their reliance on CRAs, the level
of national implementation has not been uniform. Notably, the relative scarcity
of intra-network dynamics in this area, when compared to the banking network,
may explain the current transatlantic gap in regulating CRAs, such as in the area
of conflicts of interest.
3. The insurance network.
The insurance network resides in the IAIS, which brings together insurance
regulators and supervisors from over 140 countries.2 67 The IAIS develops best
practices and core principles for insurance supervision..2 " Established in 1994 as
a forum to develop international insurance norms,269 the IAIS is composed of
190 members from 140 countries. 270 The Executive Committee, the governing
body of the organization, is composed of fifteen representatives from different
geographical regions.27 Under the Executive Committee are four committees: a
Technical Committee, an Implementation Committee, an Audit Committee, and
a Budget Committee.272 Under the Technical Committee are various working
parties responsible for drafting IAIS standards. 273 The standards are best
265
266
267
268

Progress Report on the Previous Summits, 94 (cited in note 203).
See FSB, Princaples for Reducing Reliance on CRA Ratings *2 (2010), online at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_101027.pdf (visited Oct 16, 2011).
IAIS, About the IAIS, online at http://www.iaisweb.org/About-the-IAIS-28 (visited Oct 18,
2011).
Id.
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Elizabeth F. Brown, The Development of InternationalNorms for InsuranceRegulation, 34 Brooklyn J Intl
L 953, 957, 963 (2009).
270 The NAIC and an insurance regulator from each of the fifty-six US jurisdictions serve as
members. IAIS, LAIS Members, online at http://www.iaisweb.org/IAIS-members-31 (visited Oct
18, 2011). See also Brown, 34 Brooklyn J Intl L at 963 (cited in note 269).
271 IAIS, About the IAIS (cited in note 267); Yoshi Kawai, Remarks at the Royal Institute of International
online
at
3,
2004)
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(Feb
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Affairs:
temp/IAISstandard-setting-activities-Speech-byLYoshiiroKaw
http://www.iaisweb.org/
ai.pdf (visited Oct 16, 2011).
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Art
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Kawai, IAIS Standards Setting Activities at *10 (cited in note 271). After a working party drafts a
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practices that "assist supervisors in assessing the practices that companies in
their jurisdictions have in place." 274 The Implementation Committee assists
members by organizing training and seminars, developing implementation tools,
facilitating the provision of technical assistance, and supporting the Financial
Sector Assessment Programme conducted by the IMF and World Bank.275
The G20 leaders have looked to the IAIS with respect to several issues. It
has tapped the JAIS in its efforts to coordinate capital adequacy standards. 27 6 In
response to the G20's request in 2009, the IAIS adopted a guidance paper on
the use of supervisory colleges. It has also adopted the Insurance Core Princiles
Review Process.277 As stated above, it coordinated with the BCBS and IOSCO as
part of the Joint Forum. The JAIS collaboration with the BCBS and IOSCO in
the Joint Forum preceded the 2008 financial crisis and the reports that followed
the crisis built upon that prior work.278
Finally, in response to the financial crisis and urging from the G20, the
JAIS is now "developing group-wide supervisory standards for all insurance
groups and a Common Frameworkfor the Superision of InternaionallyActive Insurance
Groups ("ComFrame').2 79 A task force chaired by a member of the Swiss Financial
Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) designed a work plan meant to provide
qualitative and quantitative requirements that would assist in monitoring group
structures, group business mixes, and intra-group transactions.280 In January

274

275

Technical Committee and endorsement from the Executive Committee. Id. The draft is finally
presented at an annual General Meeting where it must be approved by two-thirds of the
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(visited
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(2003),
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2010, the Executive Committee approved recommendations for the design and
work plan of the framework.281 The Executive Committee will implement the
plan, starting with a consultative paper in 2011, followed by implementation in
2013.282

In the insurance network, as in other networks, network dynamics
complicate the G20's coordination efforts. The IAIS efforts, particularly those in
connection with ComFrame, have spurred US regulatory efforts.283 CoMFrame
addresses holding company capital adequacy, an issue already addressed by the
EU in its regulations of insurers284 through its Sokveng II directive. Sohveng II
establishes a risk-based regulatory regime,285 sets new capital adequacy and risk
management standards, and "aims to change investment behaviour by imposing
varying capital charges on assets."2 16 A real fear exists as to whether US efforts
would pass an EU equivalency test with Sokveng II. 287 US industry feels that the
EU system is too costly.288 Working through the IAIS, as well as the EU, the US
is attempting to influence the Soveng II standards. US insurers, working through
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, have tried to become
part of a provisional regime that, at least for some time, will be treated as
"equivalent" to the EU's Sokveng II."'
All in all, there is wide disagreement between the EU and US approaches,
which undermines some intra-network dynamics such as persuasion and

http://www.iaisweb.org/-temp/ 9_january 2010_IAISapproves-development oLa
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16, 2011).
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(visited Oct 17, 2011).
Steve Johnson, Insurers Gear up for New Charges (Fin Times Jan 30, 2011), online at
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negotiation. The back and forth between the US and EU is taking place at the
same time that the IMF, as instructed by the G20, is implementing its MAP
program, which assesses the stability of each country's financial architecture,
including the capital adequacy standards for insurers.290 The dynamics in this
area largely remain to be seen and it will be interesting to note how the G20's
push for the IMF to implement the MAP influences the dynamics between the
EU and the US as well as among other key players.
4. The trade network.
It is controversial whether there exists a genuine trade network that
functions at the G20 level. As a result of the 2008 financial crisis, the G20
tapped the WTO along with the OECD and UNCTAD to monitor and report
on the trade and investment measures amongst the G20 countries. 291 These
institutions generated several reports detailing the types and impact of various
trade and investment measures. Aside from being tasked with a reporting
function that was already being undertaken in some respects by the WTO, the
trade network has not been incorporated into the ongoing efforts of the G20.
To be fair, the very preparation of these reports can be said to have restrained
countries in their enacting of protectionist measures. But this participation has
been somewhat marginalized, as the G20 progress reports and Leaders Summit
declarations reveal. While there is language calling for the conclusion of the
Doha Round and the need to resist protectionist tendencies, the WTO, OECD,
and UNCTAD joint reports evince a sense of frustration that the G20 has not
pushed for more on the trade front. While trade officials have significant
independent power to act on behalf of their countries in relations with other
countries, they are still bound by domestic politics. Thus, it would be difficult to
claim that the trade network exists in the G20 as an independent network.
V. EVALUATING THE G20's COORDINATION
Having identified a model of new global governance in the G20's
coordination of multiple TRNs, the next step would be to evaluate the model.
One might conceive two basic criteria for this purpose. First, does it work?
Second, is it legitimate?

When ascertaining whether it works, critics often point to the tedious
process of G20 operation, particularly after the initial success in coordinating
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anti-crisis measures.292 Some critics simply question the empirical foundation for
defining "success." 293 Others consider the lack of satisfying progress as a
structural dilemma inherent in the nature of a network.294 We would break the
legitimacy question into three sub-questions: is it (1) accountable, (2) equitable,
and (3) appropriately representative? 295 The G20's opaque nature raises
transparency and accountability questions. Also, now that most network
operations are undeniably dominated by the Western developed countries, poor
countries' concerns about alienation, marginalization, and even exploitation
should not be readily dismissed. Finally, even though TRNs may claim
legitimacy based on expertise, TRN insularity raises concerns, given their
influence in a pluralistic world.
A. The Effectiveness of G20 Operation
Assessing the G20's efficacy requires an assessment of the coordinated
network structure generally and also an inquiry into whether the G20 has in
particular accomplished what it has set out to do. Unsurprisingly, neither inquiry
will be free from debate. As Alexandroff and Kirton point out, the experts
disagree about whether the G20 structure will be an effective one. Some see it as
a step backward from rules-based multilateralism, or as an outright failure, while
others see it as a strong start to creating a much-needed global governance
regime.296 Looking more particularly at the tasks that the G20 has set out for
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293

294

295

296

See, for example, Marina Larionova, Assessing G8 and G20 Effectiveness in Global Governance So Far,
31 Intl Org Res J 99, 99 (2010) (noting that there is information that would call into question the
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See Kenneth Anderson, Squaring the Circle? Reconciling Sovereignty and Global Governance through Global
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Hopes Fadingfor Salvation at the Summit, The Guardian, Observer Business, Media & Cash Section 4
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Interestingly, these criteria in themselves might conflict with each other. For example, scholars
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developing countries, criticize its exclusive membership, which keeps those countries at the
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See Alexandroff and Kirton, The "Great Recession" at 177-78 (cited in note 102).
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itself and its success in accomplishing those tasks, the response has been varied
as well.297
First, it is vital to recognize that the effectiveness of a G20 operation
depends largely on that of the TRN itself as a regulatory engine. In this regard,
the verdict on the efficacy of the TRN among scholars is a mixed one. AnneMarie Slaughter argues a government network is the "real new world order," 29 8
and the "blueprint for the international architecture of the 21st century." 299 Kal
Raustiala even argues that government networks could complement treaties by
facilitating their operation or smoothing their negotiation, or even supplement
them by conducting certain gap-filling functions.300 However, Kenneth
Anderson rightly points out the difficulty of evaluating "whether these
government networks are actually solving problems or merely talking about
problems."'30 '
Skeptics challenge the eventual effectiveness, and thus the very rationale, of
a TRN. Their skepticism is two-fold: empirical and structural. First, skeptics may
contend that the G20 case study suffers a selection bias. They may argue that its
alleged success hinges mostly on its subject matter rather than on the network
operation itself. In other words, they contend that the network theory would not
work as well in more sensitive areas such as arms control or nuclear non-

297

298

299
300
301
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Slaughter, 76 Foreign Aff at 197 (cited in note 20).
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proliferation as it has in financial regulation.3 02 Likewise, skeptics might point
out the lack of empirical confirmation of the political cross-bargain between
certain regulatory subjects. In theory, one might reasonably speculate that the
US might cede to the EU's penchants for stricter CRA regulation in exchange
for the latter's adoption of a modified version of the Volcker rule. 3
Admittedly, the subject-matter of networking is critical for its potential
success. As seen in the government networks addressing the Y2K problem,
those issues around which networkers share strongly converging interests are
more readily prone to a coordinated response from networkers than other
issues.3 04 And while the G20 may claim success in addressing the financial
crisis,305 it has not been able to agree on the post-crisis measures, in particular
the global currency imbalances. These issues appear to be analogous to those
related to "vital national security interests" or those "touching on issues of high
domestic political sensitivity."3"' Therefore, the issue-specificity matters in
determining the overall success of G20 operation, though it might not be the
sole factor.307
Perhaps a more difficult question might be how to define success or
failure. This question is basically an empirical one. If one focuses solely on end
products from the G20's coordination, there might be plenty of proofs for its
success, as long as an evaluator fully appreciates the incremental nature of such
norm-making processes and thus the inevitably soft attributes of these
prototypes. Yet if one ascribes its success to regulatory changes that produce
real-life behavioral changes, not merely the existence of newly-crafted multiple
regulatory standards, we might have to wait for some time before we render any
definite judgment. Indeed, what might at first seem a success can be proven later
to be a failure.30 s Likewise, one might argue that those new standards would have
302
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materialized anyway from national, not necessarily global, initiatives. In such
case, the G20 would have played a rather modest role.
In contrast, some scholars pin their skepticism on the very structure of
TRNs. They question the power of the bonds or socialization among
networkers. They basically view networkers as government officials who tend to
serve and be controlled by their domestic constituencies, rather than having
loyalty to a "hypothetical global polity" such as a transgovernmental network."'
In this context, Kenneth Anderson observes that government officials "are
primarily fiduciaries acting on behalf of others whose values they represent, not
seekers of reason or the truth as such, and they are not free to ignore the
constituents they represent and to depart on their own searches for truth with
their fellow truth-seekers in an international forum."310 Skeptics also argue that
without any formal bargains, TRNs cannot effectively handle distributive
consequences, such as the costs and benefits of adopting a certain standard that
might negatively or positively affect each state."' Moreover, they argue that
networks alone cannot secure enforcement of those standards once they are
adopted.3 12 Finally, skeptics predict that networkers are forced to defect from
previously established standards if domestic lobbies pressure them.'
Unlike the empirical critique, however, these structural attacks against the
effectiveness of government networks betray some "realist" assumptions. They
nearly equate global governance with the world government. Without a unified
world government, all treaties, even if they are technically binding, are basically
vague anyway and unenforceable domestically on many occasions. In other
words, international cooperation-formal and informal-may not bring forth
any immediate compliance that can be secured by direct remedies in the
domestic sense. Also in our view, the structural critique is overly
consequentialist. Insofar as realists are readily inclined to dismiss the
effectiveness of transgovernmental networks based on the lack of domestic
enforcement mechanisms, they largely lose sight of the value of micro-level
networking processes. We would argue that the realist world is too simplistic:
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Basel II proposals failed to address a number of issues that could destabilize the global financial
system).
Verdier, 34 Yale J Intl L at 115 (cited in note 7).
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realists are blinded by their fidelity to enforcement. Simply, there are more
dynamics going on within the TRNs than realists conceive.
True, networkers as regulators are subject to various domestic checks and
pressures from not only their governments but also the media and the public.
Yet they are neither "masterless ronin"31' nor mere mechanical tools of their
government. They also "shape" their governments' policies. Most of them are
not political appointees. On the contrary, many are career officials who sit on
the same issue area for decades. Even politicians cannot ignore their judgments.
Likewise, skeptics assume that the domestic power dynamics on a given
regulatory issue are always linear and domestic constituencies' preferences
unitary. The reality is far more complicated. There is simply more room for
regulators, as norm-sponsors, to advocate and internalize network standards that
enjoy professional (expert) legitimacy."'s
More importantly, the soft nature of standards recommends them because
they will be reviewed by national regulators prior to implementation. As seen in
the example of EU Directives, it is up to each domestic jurisdiction to choose
how to implement the network standards, or more precisely, how to "fine-tune"
them, in accordance with its domestic legal system. In addition, a TRN can have
a monitoring or surveillance mechanism, as seen in the G20 Progress Report,
thereby securing opportunities for self-correction via feedback. Finally, the G20,
as the Leaders' Summit itself, holds some ability to encourage compliance.
In sum, the empirical line of critique on TRNs has a point in that this new
model of global governance still needs to be further vetted. Nonetheless, insofar
as the G20 has succeeded in generating various frameworks and regulatory
prototypes, its operation could be called a success.
While the ability of the G20 to generate prototypes can be used to
proclaim the G20 a success, before doing so we should critique whether these
are at least the prototypes called for by the circumstances. In other words, did
the G20 do what it had intended to do? The Washington Declaration speaks in
broad terms of promoting "effectively regulated financial markets""' but it also
sets some more specific tasks for itself, including reinforcing international
cooperation, reforming international financial institutions, and even more
specific goals, such as exercising strong oversight over CRAs."' We believe that
the G20 set for itself a primary goal of developing an architecture to coordinate
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the workings of the various TRNs to combat the crisis and that it was successful
in doing so.
The construction of the architecture had several key components. Early on,
leaders worked out the structure and role of the FSF, thereby transforming it
into the FSB."' During the Washington Summit, FSF Chair Mario Draghi and
IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn resolved their disagreement
about their roles and the relationships of their respective institutions to the new
global financial architecture. The two agreed that a lightly institutionalized FSF
would set new standards, but the "organizationally powerful IMF would then
monitor and enforce compliance with them.""' The resulting action plan
reflected this agreement.32 0
The Leaders tapped the skills of the finance ministers to initiate an "action
plan" and "timeline." 32' That action plan called upon the resources and efforts
of the IMF, the FSF, the finance ministers, the BCBS, the World Bank, the
OECD, and the key global accounting standards bodies (IASB and FASB).3 22
The G20 "Progress Reports" on its actions plans reveal a carefully
choreographed response to the crisis. 23 The Washington Action Plan, for
example, asked the FSF to assist private-sector bodies as well as key global
setting bodies with improving transparency and
accounting-standard
accountability; the FSF and IMF were asked to develop "recommendations to
mitigate pro-cyclicality"; the BCBS was asked to study stress testing models; and
the OECD was asked to facilitate tax information exchange, among other

things. 3 24
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Interestingly, in some ways the G20 acted like a mega-network,ns taking on
both a norm-making and a coordinative function. Its coordination spurred
and
guidelines
swiftly implementable
with
regulatory prototypes,
recommendations, as well as frameworks consisting of long-term action plans or
policy directions to coordinate between and among sector-specific regulatory
prototypes.3 26 In addition, the G20's unique surveillance (peer review)
mechanisms, such as the MAP,"' under which the G20 can collectively evaluate
each member's record of compliance with previous blueprints and regulatory
prototypes, is yet another sign of effectiveness in executive coordination.
Importantly, the G20 Leaders' coordination resulted in part from their shared
belief in the necessity of the response to the crisis. Undeniably, though, despite
some shared beliefs, the Leaders group remains a political grouping subject to
typical political pressures from diverse constituencies.
B. Legitimacy Questions: Accountability, Equity, and
Representation of the G20 Operation
1. Accountability.
While the ineffectiveness critique of the TRNs assumes a lack of autonomy
of network participants, the legitimacy critiques take a diametrically opposite
position on the nature of network participants. The legitimacy critiques include
concerns over accountability, equity, and representation. While we think that the
legitimacy critiques have merit, we believe that they can be ameliorated. In fact,
we hope that our dissection of the coordinated network phenomenon aids in
that effort.
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(cited in note 102).
See IMF, Factsheet:The G-20 MutualAssessmentProcess (cited in note 152).

Winter 2012

553

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

Some scholars fear that the disaggregation of a unitary state, which forms a
foundation of TRNs, would unduly weaken state authority.3 28 They fear that
those regulators would acculturate themselves too much to the network norms
or their ideals in a way that may go against the traditional values of state
sovereignty or national interest. 29 Therefore, they suspect that the government
network would "[tip] in favor of global governance in ways that devalue
democracy and democratic accountability."3 30 For example, there is a real
question of whether G20 nations are going to hand over sovereignty to the G20
or any other institution to institute changes that might be needed to ameliorate
the tension between globalization and financial risk.33'
There are responses to these concerns. TRNs are still subject to various
domestic mechanisms of checks and balances. While network participants as
norm-entrepreneurs internalize network standards by creating new domestic
legal and political dynamics, these standards are still subject to domestic judicial
or legislative challenges in a post-internalization stage.3 32 One could even argue
that TRNs may enhance accountability by providing counterforce against
domestic special interests that often capture domestic regulators and undermine
public policy. Nonetheless, the TRN's soft, informal nature may still be a
double-edged sword. Although it may facilitate interstate cooperation, it may
sidestep various checks and disciplines secured by a formal mechanism, such as
administrative or constitutional law, or the concern of transparency and
democratic accountability.33 3 Ideally, national lawmakers should be attuned to
these concerns and not allow the TRN process to foreclose national checks and
balances.334
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2. Equity.
Another potential criticism against the TRN is that the whole network
operation is biased in favor of the powerful developed countries.335 While similar
concerns exist in treaty formation, the condition is exacerbated in TRNs. The
end products of a TRN, such as regulatory prototypes, might already reflect
those of the dominant states.336 Based on his empirical study of various
government networks, Kal Raustiala observes that networks tend to impose
powerful nations' regulatory models upon less powerful countries since the
former dominate in the networking process.3 " Therefore, the North may be a
standard-setter, while the South may be a standard-taker."
In this vein, Slaughter, the chief advocate of TRNs, herself acknowledges
that regulatory convergence toward network norms, often pressured by the very
dynamics of a network, might be seen as illegitimate in a certain domestic
political context."' Stephen Toope even argues that "[n]etworks . . . are sites of

power, and potentially of exclusion and inequality." 3" Likewise, networks might
undermine the traditional space of more formal public international law under

335
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335).
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which less powerful countries might receive better protection via sovereign
equality. 341
While this power disparity critique holds water in general, particular
benefits may still exist under certain circumstances for less-developed members
of the network when they adopt pre-made, pre-tested regulatory standards of
major advanced countries, in particular through strategic co-optation, discussed
above.342 First, such regulatory importation may reduce regulatory costs in that
importing jurisdictions need not create those standards from scratch. 4 1 Second,
from the standpoint of less developed members, adopting the dominant
member's standards tends to accord the former's standards an aura of
legitimacy, which in turn encourages more members to adopt the dominant
standards, such as those of the US. 3 " Third, as more members within the TRN
adopt a certain (dominant) standard, the utility generated by adopting that
standard tends to increase. Economists label this phenomenon of selfproliferation of dominant standards the "network effect."3 45 Moreover, at least
as far as the G20 is concerned, the new geography of power embodied in the
G20 membership could mitigate power disparity concerns to some extent.
Admittedly, questions still remain regarding whether this is the right
representation, whether there are countries missing, and whether the northern
countries have too much influence.346
It is true that some less developed countries' government officials may still
lack both physical and technical resources necessary to participate actively in the
networking to maximize the aforementioned regulatory benefits. This is basically
a "development" issue, which developed countries might want to tackle in terms
of development assistance, such as capacity-building efforts.347 Markedly, it is in
the interest of developing countries that these less developed countries are better
341 Philip Alston, The Myopia of the Handmaidens: InternationalLayers and GlobaliZadon, 8 Eur
435, 446 (1997).
342 See Section II.B.
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equipped in engaging in the networking process and bringing regulatory
prototypes home since these developing countries' involvement will increase the
regulatory impact of the networking.
3. Representation.
The use of coordinated networks also raises a host of other legitimacy
questions. Representativeness, or input legitimacy,348 seems weak because, as we
know, networkers are not elected; they tend to be civil servants. The career
regulator status of network participants means that network legitimacy is based
more on expertise, or output legitimacy,3 4 9 than on representativeness. TRNs
may be perceived as legitimate because they produce good work.350 Of course,
what constitutes good work assumes a normative position, so even the expertise
justification is not perfect. Financial regulation affects environmental efforts, 351
labor, pensions,353 health care,354 and even food security.3 s Specialized career
regulators are poorly situated to consider the externalities imposed on other
issue areas. Bank regulators in the banking network come from a common
background and experience. Their ability to tolerate risk may be different from
someone who focuses on labor or healthcare or even trade. However we
conceive of legitimacy, 356 we need to be able to evaluate to what extent
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unrepresentative or expert institutions reach beyond their expertise to account
for the values of a pluralistic society.
One might claim that it is the coordination of the G20 that legitimizes the
goals of the TRNs. We would argue that such a claim needs careful examination.
One would have to consider to what extent the G20 could (and did) take
account of the interests and constituencies affected by the TRNs. Our concern
here is not that a political grouping such as the G20 could never legitimize the
work of the TRNs, simply that we should not assume that it does. Nor should
we allow the expert status of the TRNs to supply the G20 with a veneer of
legitimacy that may be undeserved.
In addition to the general concerns of representativeness, there are some
specific representativeness concerns that stem from the work that TRNs do.
Networkers' expertise, their insular dealings, and the matters at stake subject
them to a unique danger of capture. Most agencies face capture by special
interests because those special interests have tremendous incentives to focus
their efforts on persuading the agency to adopt favorable positions."' More
dispersed groups that may be affected by the agency have less ability to
coordinate."' Capture at the TRN level is especially problematic for several
reasons. The networks collect an elite set of regulators working, at times, far
away in secluded settings. These regulators are already known to industry and in
some instances move between government work and industry. These regulators
are particularly attractive to special interest groups because capturing just one of
the regulators may allow an interest group a veto over the entire process. 1 But
what is particularly problematic is the influence of different states' positions on
any particular proposal. Suppose that regulator from State A wants a rule
regulating hedge funds that is fairly strict and enforceable. Regulator from State
B agrees that hedge funds should be regulated but prefers a softer approach.
Lobbyist C (working for the hedge fund industry) will not only lobby State A to
change its position but will also lobby State B to press hard on regulator from
State A.
The fluid and incremental nature of networks also calls for a new
conception of legitimacy. Networks operate over a period of time. Their tasks
change, sometimes at their own insistence. Our conception of legitimacy must
account for the fact that networks may sometimes act as semi-autonomous
norm generators working over time.36 o The combination of this incremental
357
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work and the fact that their end products often harden into domestic law leads
to the possibility of a gloss of unwarranted legitimacy."' Further, because their
work spans decades, they invest time, credibility, and capital that creates a certain
amount of path dependence. Once a national jurisdiction considers hardening a
network prototype or recommendation through regulation or legislation there
has already been considerable buy-in because of the amount of time and
expertise expended at the network level. Thus, there is a real concern whether
the national checks and balances discussed above will be side stepped. We would
worry that the incremental process could undermine national debate. Thus, our
conception of legitimacy must account for the incremental and semiautonomous operations of networks. TRNs need to manage their legitimacy
proactively and seek input and processes that justify their work over a period of
time. States must ensure that their national processes are not short-circuited.
TRN's insularity and technical focus also create a challenge for
representative legitimacy. TRNs hear from the same voices, in part because in
order to converse intelligently in their world one must speak the technical
language they speak.362 One might wish to complement TRN's expertise with
input legitimacy in the form of additional process or indirect representation. For
example, transparency can help. One might perceive TRNs as more legitimate if
their proceedings were viewed and understood by more people. In this regard,
TRNs should reach out to the public and inform it of their missions and
achievements. These "social marketing" efforts are necessary to gain
understanding and support directly from the people, not necessarily through the

medium of states.3 63
Nonetheless, transparency has costs as well. Transparency can sometimes
thwart negotiations.364 And one can never assure transparency in all aspects of
negotiations.365 Alternatively, opening the TRN process to members of civil
society, for example, might improve process, representation, and transparency,
but it is less than a perfect solution. More participation might mean more
delays166 or even derailment of regulatory efforts.36 ' Allowing for more

J Ind L at 930-35 (cited in note 85).
See Kelly, 11 Chi J Intl L at 547 (cited in note 160).
Regarding "social marketing," see Social Marketing Institute, Social Marketing, online at
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participation does not mean it will be forthcoming. Both the BCBS and IOSCO
have public comment procedures but receive comments almost exclusively from
industry insiders. Finally, one should not assume that civil society is itself
accountable or representative in all respects."' The type of process or procedure
needs to be coordinated as well. Our conception of legitimacy may need to be
more contextual.369
In sum, while the G20 coordination tends to raise a number of
accountability and legitimacy concerns, they are not insurmountable. Yet the
G20 should first acknowledge, not dismiss, the validity of those concerns. The
G20 should also find ways to address each concern, focusing on its unique
context. One solution might not serve all occasions. For example, measures
enhancing transparency, if implemented randomly, might in fact unduly retard
the decision-making process at the professional level.
VI. CONCLUSION
Coordinated TRNs herald a new model of global governance that is
flexible, spontaneous, and effective. As seen in the G20 example, the
coordinated TRN model can deliver prompt regulatory responses to the global
challenges of our time, such as the recent financial crisis. One might reasonably
speculate that a conventional international response through pure diplomacy or
treaty-making would not have achieved the same result. As the G20 leaders
themselves declared with confidence, the TRN model "worked."370
Nonetheless, this nascent paradigm of global governance has attracted
various criticisms from different standpoints, such as efficacy and legitimacy. As
discussed above, some of these criticisms are not without merit, while others
may be exaggerated. Certainly we want to consider the meritorious concerns.
First, governments, including the G20 members, should facilitate more
communication and better networking among like-minded networkers
(government officials) and between these networkers and international
organizations that often offer forums for such networking. For this purpose,
governments should encourage personnel exchanges and hold many policy
discussion forums, such as workshops and seminars, so that regulators in the
same sector from different countries can brainstorm and deliberate on areas of
367

368
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common interest. As Kal Raustiala argues, government networks could
complement treaties by facilitating their operation or smoothing their
negotiation, or even supplement them by conducting certain gap-filling
functions.37 1 In a related vein, governments should also consider issue areas that
these networks affect that are beyond their areas of expertise and take steps to
include voices that speak to those issue areas. Civil society may be able to offer
assistance in this regard; however, government must be mindful of whether civil
society participants are themselves legitimate.
Second, developed countries should offer a genuine, not merely lip-service,
level of development aid to developing countries to boost the latter's human
capital. Without serious capacity-building, developing countries cannot
effectively participate in this networking process. In this situation, any network
standard (regulatory prototype) would have a hard time surviving the dominance
critique. 372
Third, TRNs should establish more active, rigorous and consistent
surveillance mechanisms to increase the overall efficacy of their network
standards. Without this policy evaluation and feedback process, any initial
blueprints or regulatory prototypes would soon cease to evolve. Importantly, it is
the characteristic nature of a government network that a network standard
should continuously evolve toward a more solid outcome.
Fourth, government should invest more in social marketing or public
relations over the network phenomenon. For most people, the network
phenomenon remains esoteric. Insofar as people are ill-informed of this new
model of global governance, its prospect is not bright. Moreover, government
networks can anticipate any constructive criticisms from domestic constituencies
and civil society only when they are well-informed of the network
phenomenon.37 3
Finally, the G20 as a mega-network, or a network of networks, faces unique
challenges that may not be shared by other individual networks. While a network
symbolizes the "disaggregation" of the state,3 74 in so far as each network is a
sector-specific and de-centralized phenomenon, the G20 "re-aggregates" those
multiple networks into a mega-network, which inevitably restores a conventional
inter-nationalrepresentativeness. As long as the G20 holds this plenipotentiary
nature, the current site of membership will continue to be debated, probably
without any immediate consensus. Moreover, as the exigency of the current
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financial crisis eventually ebbs, the political capital bestowed on the G20
network will also decline.37 s Under this circumstance, the erstwhile strong
professional cohesion that binds various individual networks together may
disappear. Then, the G20 may degrade into an empty talk shop.
To avoid this worst-case scenario and preserve the G20 momentum, some
pundits, including Cannes G20 Summit host, French President Nicolas Sarkozy,
propose that a permanent secretary be instituted for the G20. Plausible as this
proposal may sound in the first place, it also generates new dilemmas for the
G20. First, the G20 has in fact been successful due to soft institutionalization.
Yet with this hard institutionalization and consequent augmented
bureaucratization, the G20 may lose its characteristic agility in policy response.
Second, this new mega-bureaucracy, which may only parallel the UN in its
magnitude, may invite a familiar foreboding of a World Government among
sovereigntists. Such foreboding may cost the G20 some legitimacy, regardless of
its merits.
In conclusion, it is fair to state that the hitherto success of TRNs in
general, as well as that of the G20 in particular, may not offer a firm guarantee
for their future prosperity. Although this new model of global governance is
salutary, the jury is still out for a final verdict. Meanwhile, however, the G20 has
enough room to further evolve into a better paradigm of global governance.
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